By Josep Zapater
I. Introduction
Between the 29th and 31st of July 2026, around 80,000 migrants and asylum seekers arrived at the small Spanish city of Ceuta, situated in Africa and sharing a land border with Morocco. Dozens drowned. Most had returned by the first week of August. Thousands, including unaccompanied minors, remained in the city over the following weeks.
A political storm ensued about the causes and nature of the crisis. Some accused Morocco of waging “hybrid warfare” on Spain. Others called it a migration crisis and asked for a better humanitarian response. In the wake of the arrivals, activists and human rights organizations denounced a serious situation of abandonment and abuse of migrants, results from a lack of services, violence, and summary expulsion of those seeking asylum.
I argue in this article that humanitarian protection, understood as immediate, operational action to protect human rights and dignity, must be present in European crises such as Ceuta. Humanitarian protection complements State interventions when they are absent or insufficient. At the same time, it is complementary to the relatively longer cycle of human rights interventions, which seek to spur States into action through reporting, advocacy, denunciation and litigation. Humanitarian protection is understood here as an element of humanitarian action and should be distinguished from humanitarian stay arrangements, which allow non-nationals to remain in a country on humanitarian grounds.
This article is based on my observations and informal interviews during ten days of collaboration with local NGOs in Ceuta in the first half of September, as well as relevant documentation.
II. The Ceuta crisis
Right after the start of the crisis, shops closed in the city centre and many inhabitants remained at home. Around the 9th of August, after the first massive returns, demonstrations started, complaining about the slow pace of the response by the Spanish Government.
While most recent arrivals returned to Morocco during the first week of August, up to 15,000 persons remained in the city, among them unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers from countries in conflict such as Yemen and Sudan. Others, perhaps the majority, were Moroccans fleeing joblessness and lack of opportunity. Migrants and asylum seekers formed spontaneous camps on the beaches, slept rough, rented overcrowded flats in poor neighbourhoods or obtained shelter and assistance from grassroots associations.
Existing reception facilities were quickly overwhelmed. Grassroots associations and local NGOs, with support from local authorities, established improvised camps for women and unaccompanied minors, and distributed hot meals. The Spanish Red Cross and the Government provided some assistance at makeshift camps at the city’s beaches. After arduous negotiations, on the 17th of August the Spanish Government and local authorities agreed to establish a few formal camps. A formal coordination and crisis management mechanism was only established on the 25th of August, comprising key ministries and local authorities and charged with overseeing humanitarian action, assistance, social services, border management, security, international cooperation and return of migrants and asylum seekers. No local mechanism was formally established, nor were channels put in place for NGO or civil society participation.
An acute political storm erupted in the wake of the crisis. In Europe, 22 leaders wrote to the EU leadership accusing Spain of creating a pull factor through the recent mass regularisation of undocumented migrants. Shortly thereafter, Ministers of the Interior of EU countries requested measures to strengthen securitization of Europe’s borders and migration management.
In Spain, some mainstream political parties accused the Government of weakness in the face of Moroccan “hybrid warfare”, and called for the suspension of asylum and immediate, massive expulsions. Far right politicians openly called for participants in the “invasion” to be “hunted down”. They also accused humanitarian workers, some of whom had already been the targets of threats and attacks, of helping the “invaders”. Within the Government, not all ministers saw eye to eye on what was and was not legally possible. In the meantime, political tensions impeded the transfer of unaccompanied minors to mainland Spain, which would have provided adequate care and relieved Ceuta’s local services.
In the field, reports started to emerge of an acute lack of services, abuse against new arrivals and humanitarians, and cases of refoulement of asylum seekers. Spanish activists started reporting almost immediately through Instagram and TikTok. The Spanish Ombudsman opened investigations. On the 21st of August, Human Rights Watch denounced appalling humanitarian conditions, cases of rape and a lack of safe conditions for unaccompanied children. On the 16th of September, investigative journalists accused the Spanish Army of systematic abuse of migrants and asylum seekers, including beatings, stealing of mobile phones and forcing youth to get a crew cut. On the 30th of September, Amnesty International denounced widespread torture and maltreatment by the Army, including sexual abuse and humiliation of women– the Army reportedly had “orders to make [migrants and asylum seekers] uncomfortable”. Amnesty International reports 28 opened investigations by the judiciary on sexual violence against migrant women and girls. Amnesty also denounced the forced return of three Yemeni asylum seekers.
Reports of acute lack of services and abuse are mutually reinforcing, repeated and based on evidence. They are also broadly consistent with my own observations, as well as with accounts by local observers well acquainted with the situation.
I also observed examples of unequal protection by security forces in Ceuta. Presence of security forces appeared to be much higher in the more well-to-do downtown, around makeshift camps of young migrants and asylum seekers at the beaches, and in front of supermarkets, allegedly to stop migrants from buying and reselling goods for a small profit. Comparatively, presence was scant in the poorer western neighbourhoods, and in encampments for women or unaccompanied children. This is consistent with Amnesty International reports that young men are being prioritized over women and children for shelter assistance, to take them out of the streets.
This suggests that security is not only unequal but also geared much more towards control and intimidation than protection of highly vulnerable persons. While these observations could not be further verified, they are consistent with the analyses of at least two well-informed local observers I interviewed.
Thus, a pattern emerges in Ceuta of a rather serious human rights situation of migrants and asylum seekers, together with credible allegations of a delayed, insufficient and even abusive response by authorities. It is, at this point, legitimate to ask ourselves whether the concept and practice of humanitarian protection could fill a crucial gap in Ceuta and possibly in similar crises at Europe’s borders. I examine these important questions in the next two sections.
III. The concept and practice of humanitarian protection – and its crises
Humanitarian protection has long been part and parcel of humanitarian action. It is best understood as immediate, operational interventions to protect the rights and dignity of individuals and groups during humanitarian crises. Simply put, humanitarian protection is the operational consequence of the principle that if the State does not protect vulnerable people during crises, someone else must. From an institutional perspective, the concept and practice of humanitarian protection have long been embedded into the so-called humanitarian system: the international institutional ecosystem, with its own governance and coordination structures, of public and private donors, international NGOs, UN bodies, and think tanks.
The mechanisms of humanitarian protection include prevention and response to sexual abuse through camp design and physical security, as well as physical, psychological and legal protection of victims. They include also alternative foster care arrangements for unaccompanied children when this is temporarily the best option. Similarly to human rights-based action, humanitarian protection may entail advocacy with authorities and armed forces and when other things fail, public denunciation. Effective humanitarian protection requires a constant cycle of analysis and response, supported by permanent presence on the ground and close, trustful interactions with the populations it intends to protect.
Humanitarian protection is supportive or complementary to both official and grassroots interventions. Exceptionally, such as when States are unable or unwilling to protect, or when they are the perpetrators, it seeks to operate with a level of autonomy from state mechanisms. As all humanitarian action, humanitarian protection must seek, at least, to not exacerbate existing conflicts or tensions. Thus, it must be extremely reactive to community views and sensitivities.
The institutional ecosystem behind the doctrine and practice of humanitarian protection has been in crisis for years. At Europe’s borders, researchers of border migration have increasingly pointed at the toning down of advocacy and denunciation by large, EU-financed humanitarian agencies, who focus now on material aid. They have also denounced the increasing criminalization of those acting more independently, such as such as rescue-at-sea NGOs and activists.
At the global level, the crisis of humanitarian protection and, in general, contemporary humanitarianism reached an acute stage in 2024, triggered by deep budget cuts. Thus, while the humanitarian system is still alive, both its credibility and its ability to operate have taken a serious toll in the last ten years.
It is now fitting to turn to an important question: does the concept and practice of humanitarian protection, irrespective of who defines, leads and implements it, fill an important gap in border crises such as the one unfolding in Ceuta?
IV. The role of humanitarian protection at Europe’s borders
At Europe’s external borders, Ceuta is a useful case study of who protects the rights and dignity of migrants and asylum seekers beyond mere humanitarian aid, in the absence of strong humanitarian protection mechanisms and when State intervention is insufficient or even abusive. This role is now largely adopted by activists of various levels of professionalization publishing on Instagram and TikTok, investigative journalists, and human rights outfits such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and national human rights mechanisms. Meanwhile, the dense network of activist lawyers, think tanks and academics in Europe is actively using the complex, slow moving European judicial and human rights architecture to improve access to rights for migrants and asylum seekers.
This ecosystem is sorely needed, and must be supported. It is noteworthy how, in Ceuta, activist outfits were present almost from the outset, not only documenting and denouncing abuse but providing an important basis for larger human rights organisations, at a later stage, to more formally advocate with local authorities and the Spanish Government.
The situation in Ceuta reveals, however, a very relevant gap. This refers to two key characteristics specific to humanitarian protection that human rights action can rarely replicate. They are the ability to quickly deploy operations, to complement, support or replace State or grassroots actions, and the fluidity and complementarity between “hard” interventions (i.e. operations) and “soft” ones (i.e. negotiation, advocacy or denunciation). Let us see how this could have played out in Ceuta.
As regards operations, a few crucial aspects stand out in Ceuta. One is adequate shelter for women and unaccompanied children – a crucial preventive action against sexual and other forms of abuse. Here, humanitarian protection actors can provide quick financial support to local NGOs running shelters, together with training on how adaptations in shelter and camp design help prevent abuse. Also, in the face of overwhelmed social services, the identification, referral and response to specific cases of abuse is the bread and butter of humanitarian protection – with fluid levels of integration with existing official systems, balancing speed with institutional sustainability.
A permanent field presence enables a quicker, deeper understanding of the main issues faced by migrants and asylum seekers. This includes, for instance, obtaining a basic understanding of asylum needs, based on individual and nationality profiles. This can feed advocacy on the level and quality of asylum processing capacities needed. A very relevant aspect is also deterrence. Visible witnessing can help prevent abuse, such as beatings and humiliations by the Army, as well as summary expulsions of asylum seekers. This works best when coupled with advocacy based on a robust understanding of principles and laws of e.g. asylum and law enforcement. This is a good example of complementarity between operations and advocacy.
Three additional points merit specific, if brief, analysis here. One is the moral hazard of replacing those with both the duty and the ability to intervene – in the case of Ceuta, Spanish authorities. For obvious reasons, humanitarian action does not require, at least not in the short term, an analysis of why significant gaps in protection and assistance remain unfilled. The risk of a moral hazard still needs, however, to be addressed. This is best done through increased advocacy, operational support and if necessary, public denunciation. When authorities are visibly willing to protect, such as, in Ceuta, local authorities supporting shelters for unaccompanied children, humanitarian agencies progressively retreat as authorities take over. When not, such as in cases of abuse by law enforcement, humanitarians must step in without qualms.
Another one is complementarity with human rights actors. Humanitarian protection provides quick, operational fixes to complement the longer cycle of State’s expected reaction to human rights analysis, reporting, advocacy, denunciation and, in some cases, litigation. There are important overlaps in advocacy and denunciation between humanitarian protection and human rights approaches. Good operational examples show a fluid exchange of information, coordination and complementarity, depending on who’s best placed to intervene or what are the best adapted techniques in each situation. For instance, in the Central African Republic in 2014 UNHCR and Human Rights Watch regularly shared information and compared advocacy strategies on issues such as humanitarian evacuations.
In Ceuta, human rights actors and activists were possibly best placed to denounce physical abuse by authorities. Humanitarian protection actors could have been complementary by implementing operational protection mechanisms for women and children. Operational involvement and support to existing social protection systems also provide good leverage for humanitarian protection advocacy. Best practice also dictates that advocacy approaches by human rights and humanitarian actors are, at least, complementary.
A last, rather sensitive aspect of humanitarian protection refers to community relations. Ceuta is a small place bordering a large, ambitious neighbour. Against a long history of real coexistence, Ceuta’s populations of Moroccan and mainland-Spanish descent retain a degree of mutual wariness. The sudden arrival of a high number of persons, most of them Moroccans, was bound to create a pervasive sense of uneasiness and interruption of the normal course of life. Local observations and interviews reveal that these sentiments had different nuances depending on the ethnic, linguistic and religious background of Ceuta’s communities.
These anxieties are distinct from politically motivated inflammatory language, and must be listened to and considered, including by humanitarian protection actors. Here, it is not easy at all to advance how precisely this could be done, against the inflamed political climate. Basic honesty dictates transparency and communication with local communities. At the same time, it is fair to conclude that the slow response by authorities, and the lack of coherent information on the legality, process and deadlines applicable to asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors and other non-nationals, including on returns, did not lead to constructive relations in Ceuta between some locals and humanitarians. It may even have contributed to leave them vulnerable to accusations of helping thousands of non-nationals to stay, in a city where many locals felt demographically overwhelmed. There are no easy answers for this kind of situation.
V. Conclusion
I hope to have shed some light on how the concept and practice of humanitarian protection can fill crucial gaps in Ceuta, as well as perhaps similar crises at Europe’s borders. I have also tried to show how it can operate in complementarity, or mutual support, with interventions by authorities and human rights bodies, and progressively adapt to the operational environment. An obvious question remains: what is the way ahead?
It is dubious that much political will exists now in Europe to finance, or even to tolerate, humanitarian protection during crises like Ceuta. There are also no signs, at the time of writing, of lessons learnt exercises which could establish on a more formal basis the extent to which this gap in Ceuta establishes a precedent for further crises. Existing exercises, such as judicial investigations and parliamentary inquiries, are rather adversarial and hence not the best vehicle for learning.
The crisis in Ceuta should, however, constitute a call to establish a dialogue between organisations protecting or assisting migrants and asylum seekers during crisis – including national human rights mechanisms, human rights organizations, national and local NGOs, UNHCR and activists. This could help document early lessons learnt for Ceuta. This includes speed of deployment, ability to operate, complementarity of collaboration, and effectiveness of different approaches – including operational support, negotiation, advocacy, denunciation, and litigation. It goes without saying that this should also include examining why a humanitarian protection approach was absent in Ceuta – and what should be done differently next time to overcome identified obstacles.
This dialogue would also pave the way for further discussions on the best modalities to intervene in current and future crises. The political, social and financial environment in Europe is decidedly not conducive for intervention. But this, together with the gravity of events in Ceuta, should rather contribute to further spur these key organizations into action.
Josep Zapater worked with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1996 until 2025 and is now an independent consultant and researcher. With a protection profile and specialization in armed conflict and internal displacement, he has held responsibilities in various countries including Colombia, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, and Lebanon. He has participated in emergency missions in Haiti, Mozambique, the Philippines, and Ethiopia.
Josep Zapater has degrees in Philosophy and international relations, and a postgraduate degree in International Humanitarian Law. He has also undertaken training in public policy analysis, conflict analysis, humanitarian negotiation, risk and crisis management and research in the refugee and forced migration fields. He has published on armed conflict, protection, refugees, and humanitarian work in international magazines. He speaks Spanish, Catalan, French, English and Persian, with some knowledge of Arabic.
Research and writing interests are on humanitarian protection policy, advocacy with Governments, community-based protection in humanitarian work, participatory approaches and public accountability to populations affected by conflict and disasters.
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