By Chiamaka Rita Akpuogwu
In October 2026, I attended a virtual seminar on the implementation of the new Common European Asylum System (CEAS),[1] which began applying across the EU on 12 June 2026 (Bundesregierung, 2026). Legal scholars and lawyers compared its implementation specifically in Germany and Switzerland. The reform introduces, among other provisions, a border return procedure, a crisis regulation and a screening regulation. Yet the main takeaway was how much remains unsettled. The scope of legal remedies is still unclear, and state-funded independent legal counselling by NGOs in Germany may be cut (van Brunnersum, 2026). If specialists cannot yet say how the system will work, what does that mean for the people who must live under it?
I have ruminated on this question for some time. For roughly ten months, I have conducted ethnographic fieldwork with African Christian communities in Germany on how they understand and navigate the law. I do so as an African migrant with a temporary residence status myself. What I found is that people experience Germany’s migration regime as fraught with uncertainty. My argument is that this uncertainty is produced by that regime through the framing of migration as a crisis, the wielding of time, administrative discretion, and, prospectively, the withdrawal of legal support, and people live it as waiting, anticipation and silence. By uncertainty I mean what people cannot reliably know: how rules will be applied to them, how long any status or reprieve will last, and what an encounter with the state will cost. This is related to, but wider than, what Menjívar (2006) calls “liminal legality”, which centres on a person’s status. I also ask what my own position in the field lets me see, and what it hides.
Crisis, time and discretion: how a regime produces uncertainty
By “regime” I mean EU rules and German law together with the administrative practice through which officials apply both. Three strands of scholarship help me say how this regime produces uncertainty. The first concerns crisis. Moreno-Lax (2023) argues that reading a set of circumstances as a “crisis” reorients law- and policy-making and justifies it. “Crisification” lets actors keep their relevance, legitimise their decisions and curtail political contestation, while casting unwanted migration as a security matter and racialised non-citizens as threats. Its companion, “lawification”, codifies crisis-inspired practices into law, so that rightlessness outlasts the supposed emergency. Moreno-Lax writes about the EU’s external border, but the logic is hard to miss in a reform that carries its own crisis regulation. A crisis is meant to be temporary; the rules made in its name are not, and their open-ended, exceptional character is one source of the unpredictability I describe.
The second strand concerns time. Drangsland (2020) shows that borders operate in people’s lived temporalities. She posits that since the 2016 Integration Act in Germany, rejected asylum seekers who start a vocational training receive an Ausbildungsduldung, a suspension of deportation for the duration of the training. It is not a residency status; it ends if training is broken off, and it exists amid increasingly harsh asylum policy. Drangsland reads it as a technique of bordering that works through time, creating “reverberations of hope” while keeping people in conditional time. She draws on Mezzadra and Neilson (2013), for whom border regimes stretch and manipulate migrants’ time to produce governable subjects, and on De Genova’s (2002, p. 439) “sense of deportability”.
The third strand concerns discretion. Written rules do not apply themselves. Eule et al. (2019), drawing on Lipsky (2010), show that whether an asylum seeker can remain in a territory often depends less on formal entitlement than on street-level officials’ discretion. Bliersbach (2025), citing Griffiths (2003), makes a similar point about citizenship law: legislated rules alone do not settle their effects, which are best seen at the “street level”. Where rules are exceptional, quickly changed and administered with wide discretion, the person subject to them cannot know in advance how they will be applied. The prospective cuts to funded counselling would add to this, since they would remove one of the few ways of finding out how a rule is likely to be applied.
These strands work together. Crisis framing licenses exceptional rules; exceptional rules shorten people’s horizons and widen officials’ discretion; and the person on the receiving end is left to dwell in uncertainty and anticipation. The scholarship above explains how uncertainty is produced; my fieldwork shows how it is lived.
Anticipating consequences: scenes from a refugee café
Take a refugee café[2] in a mid-sized German university city. The first time I walked in, I arrived as a researcher. Before anyone asked about my research, however, I was asked: Which camp are you staying in? Have you started learning German? I was placed within Germany’s migration landscape before my academic affiliation became relevant, read first as another African navigating the asylum system. I use “African” with caution: the café brought together people with different origins, statuses and procedural positions, so the term is a way of being read, by the state and by participants, not a shared experience. Participants assumed I already understood their lives. Law seldom surfaced as an explicit topic, yet it organised almost every discussion: the calculations before meeting a state authority, the pressure to demonstrate integration through language, the weight of talk about possible deportation.
A recent Dublin transfer[3] made this concrete. A woman was detained after what seemed to be a routine appointment with the immigration authority and transferred to Spain. The lesson café participants drew was not about the Dublin rules as such, but about something broader: ordinary encounters with authorities can carry serious, unannounced consequences, and sharing information is how people anticipate these consequences and try to mitigate them.
The same logic shaped a demonstration I observed, after increased night-time deportation raids that disturbed asylum seekers’ privacy and heightened anxiety. Several asylum seekers at the café pressed for a protest, and it was organised. Yet, the asylum seekers declined to address the fifty-person crowd for fear of being recognised. The organisers proposed pre-recorded audio, which was rejected for the same reason. The compromise allowed anyone wanting anonymity to write a statement for someone else, mostly the German organisers, to read aloud. Silence was visible here, but it was not simple withdrawal: it was a tactic that let people make a collective claim while limiting their personal exposure. When police vans arrived, fear was palpable, and organisers handed out face masks. Most asylum seekers accepted one, and so did I. No one told me to, and no one suggested I faced any legal consequence. Yet I found myself asking the question many participants were asking silently: what if this affects my future dealings with the authorities? No exercise of state power was necessary; the possibility of scrutiny did the work. This is deportability as De Genova (2002) describes it: the possibility of removal shapes conduct long before any removal occurs.
I do not claim my legal risks were equivalent to those of asylum seekers. The vignette shows how proximity to the asylum system can make scrutiny salient even to those not subject to its procedures, and illustrates Cruz’s (2015) point that qualitative researchers are part of a web of relations, both influencing and being influenced.
What uncertainty does
These observations complicate any assumption that legal status alone determines a person’s relationship with the state. Because so much turns on how officials use their discretion, participants in the café ask not only “what is the law?” but “how might an official interpret this?”, “will this make me visible?” and “could asserting this right make my situation worse?” They try to understand the state prospectively, without being able to know how it will act. This anticipation is also socially produced: people learn the state through others’ experiences, stories and warnings, and even “incorrect” knowledge shapes conduct. That is why I read uncertainty as a response to the law rather than a deficit of the people living under it. Discretion, reform and funding decisions generate unpredictability, and anticipation, silence and selective visibility are what a reasonable person does with it. They can also be construed as tactics: pooling information, declining the microphone and writing statements for others to read are ways of acting under conditions people did not choose. Whether such unpredictability is also intended as a means of deterrence is a question I leave open. Karagiannis and Schiller (2006) argue that stringent refugee policies lead to the “abnormalisation” of refugees’ everyday lives; either way, the effects on the ground are the same.
Arendt’s (1951) “right to have rights” is relevant here. My fieldwork compels a related question: what does it mean to claim a right one cannot reliably know, or cannot safely assert? Uncertainty also runs through legal professionals, as the seminar showed, which points to a gap between law on the books and law as predictable in practice. The consequences extend beyond procedure: fear of visibility and possible jeopardisation of asylum claims, strain on mental health, a constrained capacity to imagine settled futures. One of these, I found, reaches memory itself.
Another asylum seeker visibly struggled to recount her own asylum story. She stated that it was almost two years since she arrived in Germany. She had been through a Dublin transfer and a rejected asylum claim, and was now waiting for a decision on her appeal, with no date in sight. Earlier, as she understood it, a transfer deadline had been extended without anyone telling her; she realised only when officials tried to take her after the date she had believed was the last. She herself found the sequence hard to reconstruct, and letters from the authorities, she said, felt “like a punch”. We talk about time in asylum applications: dates, sequences, deadlines. Hers was a scrambled sense of time, which can be traced to two sources: the trauma that made her flee her country of origin, and the trauma inflicted by the asylum determination process. I do not suggest that every applicant experiences this. I do suggest that a procedure that expects an ordered account from people for whom the procedure itself has made order hard imposes a cost that is material even where no rule is broken. It is also the temporal side of what Drangsland and Mezzadra and Neilson describe: a regime that stretches and suspends time from outside can also disturb how time is lived from within.
Being read: what my position allows and limits
Being read as someone navigating the asylum system gave me things and cost me things. It gave me access to an embodied dimension of anticipation, and to an openness and trust I might not otherwise have been offered. One asylum seeker at the café told me, “We came here to seek asylum, but these people want to kill us.” I understood this not as a literal claim about intent but as a statement of how the system is experienced, and of the distance between law’s promise of dignity and protection and what those most in need of it feel. Accounts of racialised mistreatment also suggest that being read as African may compound uncertainty and the sense of otherness, a line of inquiry I return to below.
Yet, my position has limits. Being read as an insider elicited trust I had not earned, and assumptions I could not easily jettison. My fear at the demonstration tells me about my own positioning, not what participants felt; and my temporary status puts me close to their world without placing me inside it. This shapes what I claim. I, therefore, treat knowledge as situated: what I can know depends on how I am read, by the state’s categories and by the networks I am immersed in. So I use my embodied responses as analytic material, checked against what interlocutors told me.
These scenes matter beyond the café. Silence about law is not the absence of law: it lives in what people avoid, delay or decline to say. Rights, too, depend on conditions of knowability and safety, not only on codification. A right that cannot be reliably known, or asserted without risk, remains formally present but practically out of reach, and the burden of anticipating state action falls most heavily on those least able to bear it. That is why the seminar’s unanswered question matters for refugee law. I cannot show that the reform has produced the practices described here, since it has only just begun to apply; my fieldwork shows the condition into which it arrives. Reliable information and independent counsel are among the few things that let a right be known and asserted without fear, and cutting them would remove one of the few counterweights to the uncertainty a regime produces.
Open questions
Several questions remain open regardless. First, what happens to people’s ability to ask anything of the law as uncertainty deepens, for example, when funded legal assistance is cut, and people lose one of the few places where legal expertise is available? Consider Millie, a pseudonym for a low-income, African American domestic worker interviewed for Ewick and Silbey’s (1992) study of how ordinary people experience law in everyday life. She is not a refugee, but her story shows what is at stake: her legal contestation succeeded only because her employers, acting as patrons, extended their routineised, entitled engagement with law to include her. In other words, her success rested on an ease with the law that was lent to her. Where no such patron exists, the loss of funded assistance leaves nothing in its place. The café offers a partial answer. One participant told me the café’s network had paid for her first legal consultation and helped her make sense of official letters, a collective form of the patronage Millie relied on. Second, how do other migration infrastructures, beyond the café in this study, work as spaces of trust that circulate and filter legal knowledge? Do they act as collective “patrons” that broker access, shield people from uncertainty and contest state authority, or do they simply manage it? Third, I resist the inclination to assume that race amplifies uncertainty or shapes its form; I will instead trace the nexus between racialised legibility and people’s relationship to the law, in how they describe encounters with officials, in what they choose to disclose to whom, and in what they do before and after such encounters. Millie’s dependence on patrons sat at the intersection of class and racialisation, and how these combine is an empirical question.
Because uncertainty is produced by how law is written, funded and enforced, understanding how people live it, including what they leave unsaid, is part of understanding the law itself.
[1] Organised by the Equal Rights Beyond Borders, the Research Training Group “Mobility Rights in the Global Context of Multiple Crises” at the University of Göttingen, the Chair of Law and Migration at Humboldt University of Berlin, the German Umbrella Organisation of Student Legal Clinics (DSR) and the Refugee Law Clinic Berlin.
[2] The café serves asylum seekers from several regions of the world, but African participants formed the majority and anchored the analysis.
[3] A Dublin transfer is the physical relocation of an asylum seeker from one EU Member State to another country legally responsible for examining their asylum application. The rules governing the transfer process are explicitly laid out in Article 29 of the Dublin III Regulation.
Chiamaka Rita Akpuogwu is a doctoral researcher in the DFG Research Training Group “Mobility Rights in the Global Context of Multiple Crises” (RTG 2987) at the University of Göttingen, Germany.
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