By Abouzar Pouradib
Introduction
In 2025, Iran and Pakistan each responded to the forced return and large-scale deportation of Afghan nationals, but through markedly different administrative mechanisms. Iran, drawing on an extensive 2022 census, identified undocumented foreign nationals and issued them temporary papers. Pakistan, by contrast, relied on its already-established system of documentation, progressively widening the scope of its repatriation and deportation policy — first targeting undocumented individuals, then holders of the Afghan Citizen Card (ACC), and later holders of the Proof of Registration card (PoR). This divergence in administrative approach points to the importance of attending to administrative capacities for identifying, registering, and classifying migrant populations, and to how such capacities are mobilized once policy shifts, rather than relying solely on economic, political, and security pressures to explain return policy. The role of documents and bureaucratic procedures in the control and governance of migration has, moreover, drawn increasing scholarly attention in recent years.
Main research question: How did Iran and Pakistan, through distinct administrative mechanisms, translate mounting pressure to manage their Afghan populations into concrete policy?
A Regional Turning Point
According to UNHCR’s 2025 Afghan Returns – One Year Recap, roughly 2.9 million Afghan nationals returned to their country in 2025 — the highest volume of returns on record. Of these, approximately 1.9 million returned from Iran and close to one million from Pakistan. In this data, the term “return” is used in a broad sense, covering not only voluntary returns and other forms of movement but deportations as well.
A more precise analysis of this trend requires a distinction between return and deportation. Of the Afghan nationals who returned to their country in 2025, 1.42 million were deported — 1.26 million from Iran and roughly 155,000 from Pakistan.
Iran: From Census to Status Determination
Making sense of Iran’s return policy toward Afghan nationals requires looking back at the country’s census of undocumented nationals. According to UNHCR, this large-scale exercise identified some 2.6 million Afghan nationals — including those who had entered Iran following the events of August 2021 — and issued them registration slips, granting a form of administrative recognition and temporary protection from deportation for the duration of the slips’ validity. What matters most about the 2022 census is that it updated Iran’s formal documentation system and identified a very large population of Afghan nationals, generating the information and mechanisms needed to distinguish among Amayesh cardholders, census-slip holders, individuals holding a passport or visa, and undocumented individuals. Amayesh cardholders have been recognized as de facto refugees since 2003; their cards are renewed annually and provide conditional freedom of movement, access to basic services, and eligibility for temporary work permits in limited job categories. Census-slip holders, by contrast, had access to only some rights and services, with more restrictive policies in 2024 affecting in particular their access to education, and were placed in a more temporary and limited administrative category.
Whether a causal relationship exists between the census and the subsequent large-scale deportations is not something the available evidence has so far confirmed: a registered infrastructure for this population already existed before the 2022 census was carried out, and the issuance of identification slips at the point of registration itself constituted a form of recognition and temporary protection.
The turning point came on 20 March 2025, when the census slips expired, bringing a very large number of Afghan nationals under a government programme for status determination, regularization, or return. From that date, slip-holders were required to determine their status, and those who did not meet the exemption criteria for continued presence in Iran were obliged to leave the country. In the process, 12,175 individuals — including persons with specific vulnerabilities and some families with mixed documentation status — received a temporary “Movaqat” card.
It is therefore more accurate to frame the relationship between the 2022 registration exercise and the 2025 policy as follows: the 2022 census built the administrative capacity needed to identify, differentiate among, and determine the status of a large share of Iran’s undocumented Afghan population, and this capacity was later drawn upon when policy shifted toward the return of foreign nationals in 2025. According to 2025 data, 42 percent of Afghans deported from Iran were census-slip holders, and 59 percent were undocumented. Put differently, formal administrative registration does not necessarily translate into durable residency status; its consequences remain contingent on the government’s subsequent decisions.
Pakistan: A Return Policy Built on Documentation Tiers
Before the latest wave of Pakistan’s return policy toward foreign nationals took effect, Afghans in the country were distributed across several major documentation tiers:
• The PoR (Proof of Registration) system: one of the central instruments of Afghan population management in Pakistan. At the conclusion of the card-renewal and document-verification process known as DRIVE, roughly 1.3 million Afghan refugees held smart PoR cards, which facilitated access to certain services, including education, healthcare, banking, and SIM-card registration. The cards’ validity had been extended in several rounds, most recently through 30 June 2025.
• Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holders: a recognized identity document and a tool for identifying Afghan nationals, though one that differed from the PoR in terms of the residency status and protection it conferred. After the return policy took effect in April 2025, ACC holders no longer had the right to remain in Pakistan, whereas PoR holders continued to lawfully access statutory and other services until their cards expired.
The stages of Pakistan’s deportation policy unfolded as follows:
• First stage: nationals without any identity documents.
• On 7 March 2025, the second stage of the programme was announced for ACC holders, with a 31 March deadline for voluntary departure.
• Enforcement of this stage began on 1 April.
• On 30 June, the validity of PoR cards expired.
• On 31 July, the third stage of the Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan (IFRP) was announced for PoR holders; after a one-month grace period, enforcement began on 1 September.
According to the figures reported, among Afghan nationals deported from Pakistan, 51 percent were undocumented, 46 percent held PoR cards, and 3 percent were asylum-seekers.
The composition of Afghans deported from Iran and Pakistan alike shows that this policy was not confined to undocumented migrants; individuals who were registered within the state system were subject to deportation as well.
One Shared Pressure, Two Administrative Architectures
The divergence between Iran’s and Pakistan’s administrative mechanisms illustrates the significance of administrative classification: to carry out this policy, Iran first had to identify a large, previously unregistered population, whereas the Pakistani government already possessed the infrastructure needed to identify and classify this population and implemented the IFRP on that same basis. The principal difference between Iran and Pakistan in the return of Afghan nationals to their country of origin can thus be examined through the lens of the administrative architecture of policy implementation.
Drawing on these two distinct national pathways, the differing administrative processes of the two countries can be formulated as follows: the capacity of the administrative apparatus to carry out a political decision to reduce the migrant population is essential, and the state must possess complete and accurate information on registration, data updating, document issuance, the creation of status categories, the conditions under which migrants may regularize their status or qualify for exemption, and coordination among the institutions that translate policy decisions into executive action.
Iran’s pathway: extensive 2022 census → issuance of temporary documents → document expiration → status assessment → selective regularization or departure.
Pakistan’s pathway: pre-existing documentation tiers → phased implementation → expansion of the policy’s scope from one documentation tier to the next.
Studies on migration governance have likewise shown that documents, case files, certificates, and other bureaucratic processes are not merely neutral administrative tools; they function as practical instruments through which state authority is exercised and migrant mobility is controlled.
The Dual Function of Registration and Documentation
Taken together, the evidence discussed so far suggests that the aim of states in registering and documenting migrants is not limited to providing support services and exercising control. By moving a migrant from an undefined status to one with a recognized identity, the state, on the one hand, extends services to that person, and on the other, uses the type of identity document held and its expiration date to make return policy more targeted. These two functions, though seemingly distinct, are in practice deployed in service of a single underlying policy: the exercise of a political decision aimed at controlling and reducing the migrant population. Administrative registration therefore does not amount to a guarantee of lasting services, and on this basis it can be said that the boundary between “registered” and “subject to return” is not fixed; it shifts whenever documents expire or government policy changes.
What This Comparison Means for Migration Governance
The comparison between Iran and Pakistan shows that migration-governance capacity depends on translating policy decisions into executive action, and that administrative capacity — built through identifying individuals, registering and updating information, issuing documents, creating status categories, setting the conditions under which migrants may regularize their status or qualify for exemption, and coordinating among institutions — provides the state with the ability it needs in this domain. Databases, identity cards, document expiration dates, and status classification together form key components of a state’s practical capacity to implement migration policy.
The use of administrative capacity in implementing migration policy carries an important message for international organizations and institutions that support the strengthening of registration and documentation systems: more accurate registration can reduce vulnerability, facilitate access to services, and enhance protection; yet should the policy environment change, that very same infrastructure may just as readily facilitate the implementation of more restrictive policies.
The value of a registration system, accordingly, should be judged by its legal guarantees, the duration and stability of the status it confers, the possibility of appealing decisions, the criteria for exemption, and its mechanisms of accountability.
Conclusion
The large-scale return of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan in 2025 was a shared regional phenomenon, yet it proceeded along two distinct administrative pathways. In Iran, the 2022 census had placed roughly 2.6 million undocumented Afghans within a temporary administrative category. With the expiration of the census slips in March 2025, the status-determination system drew a line between those permitted to remain and those required to leave the country. By year’s end, slip-holders accounted for 42 percent of all deportees from Iran.
Pakistan, by contrast, drew on the pre-existing hierarchy among the undocumented, ACC holders, and PoR holders, gradually widening the scope of IFRP enforcement from one group to the next. By year’s end, PoR holders alone accounted for 46 percent of deportees from Pakistan.
Economic, security, and political pressures can thus explain why states move toward more restrictive policies, but understanding how such policies are actually implemented requires attention to administrative capacity and to the infrastructures of registration, documentation, and classification. The comparison between Iran and Pakistan therefore points to a broader conclusion about migration governance: migration policy is shaped not only by the decisions states make, but also by the administrative systems through which they identify, document, classify, and adjudicate the status of migrants — systems that play a decisive role in determining the form and scope of policy implementation.
Abouzar Pouradib is a PhD candidate in Political Science (Public Policy) at the Islamic Azad University, Azadshahr Branch, Iran. His research focuses on migration governance, return and deportation policy, and state administrative capacity in managing migrant and refugee populations across West and South Asia. ORCID: 0000-0001-6810-4699
The views expressed in this article belong to the author/s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Refugee Law Initiative. We welcome comments and contributions to this blog – please comment below and see here for contribution guidelines.