By Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan and Raspiatur Rashpi
As Myanmar shifts from junta control to armed fragmentation, the promise of Rohingya repatriation turns into a fragile illusion—where law, politics, and humanity collide.
Coup and the Collapse of Repatriation Dream
When Myanmar’s Generals staged their coup in 2021, the dimmed hope of Rohingya repatriation faded further. For the last eight years, Bangladesh has hosted over 0.7 million Rohingya who fled the 2017 atrocities. Despite multiple mentions through diplomatic channels, Rohingyas’ repatriation lacks a clear path. The actual scenario is that the battleground has remained the same, even though the actors have changed. The power and control have shifted from an authoritarian military rule to the rise of the Arakan Army, but the insurance of dignified and safe return has become more blurred. The legal and moral questions stay the same; can the Rohingyas return to a country without territorial control and that does not recognize them as citizens? The military junta of Myanmar, under global condemnation, stands accused before the International Court of Justice in a case brought by The Gambia under the Genocide Convention of 1948. The Court’s provisional measures in 2020 directed Myanmar to prevent genocidal acts and to conserve evidence of violations against the Rohingya. Yet violence has existed in Rakhine. As the Arakan Army has extended its grip of control in recent times, civilians have started to experience challenges including displacement, uncertainty and crossfire. Some define it as a fresh political reality for the Rohingyas, it is like an old nightmare haunting in a newly designed uniform.
Chaos in Rakine: From Military Junta to Armed Rebellion
Approaching repatriation in such a situation amounts to negotiating with chaos. Neither the junta nor the Arakan Army wants to guarantee citizenship, freedom of movement, and safety. Agreements signed under these conditions risk legitimizing disorder rather than restoring justice. The shift from a centralized authoritarian military regime to a fragmented armed rebellion has not opened space for rights; it has simply increased the forces of fear. Repatriation today, if approached in such a situation, would amount to forced return to an active war zone. At the cornerstone of international refugee law stands the principle of non-refoulement, enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and practiced worldwide as customary law. It forbids any state from sending refugees back to a state where their lives or freedom would be at risk. Myanmar’s Rakhine State—now divided between the junta, the Arakan Army, and other militias is such a place. Returning Rohingya there under the guise of “voluntary repatriation” would be constructive refoulement—a forced return manipulated by diplomacy.
Principle of Non-refoulement, Illusion of Voluntariness and Bangladesh’s Protection Compass
The UNHCR Handbook of 1996 defines voluntary repatriation as dignified, safe and actually voluntary. None of these standards are currently fulfilled in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Refugees in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char express fear of statelessness and persecution repeatedly. In earlier “pilot repatriation” approaches, families refused to board buses once they learned of the insecurity in Rakhine. Without safety, citizenship or reliable international oversight, voluntariness is a myth and a language of bureaucracy masking human anxiety. Although Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its judiciary has developed a comprehensive rights-based jurisprudence that indirectly supports refugee protection. A landmark case, Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque vs. Bangladesh (1997, 49 DLR (AD) 1), expanded the doctrine of locus standi, allowing public interest litigation to vindicate environmental and human rights. The Appellate Division held that Articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution — guaranteeing the right to life and protection of law — applies to “every person,” not just citizens. This inclusive interpretation laid the foundation for rights claims on behalf of non-citizens.
Similarly, in Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association (BNWLA) vs. Government of Bangladesh (Writ Petition No. 5916 of 2008), the High Court issued directives to protect women from sexual harassment in the absence of specific legislation, relying on constitutional guarantees and international human rights standards. This case affirmed the Court’s willingness to fill legislative gaps and protect vulnerable groups through constitutional interpretation. Most importantly in ‘Ábid Khan vs. Government of Bangladesh (2003)’ the court provided citizenship to the Biharis (Urdu speaking community) born after 1971 and in ‘Md Sadaqat Khan (Fakku) & Ors. vs. Chief Election Commissioner (2008)’ the High Court Division of Supreme Court of Bangladesh acknowledged the electoral rights of the people of Urdu-speaking community, who have long been stateless in Bangladesh. They were also provided with Bangladesh citizenship and the right to vote in the country. The decision of the court is based on the constitutional commitment toward equality before the law and the principle of inherent human dignity being asserted by the constitution of Bangladesh. Though the judgment does not overtly discuss the rights of refugees, it demonstrates an expanded legal principle for the protection of stateless people under the constitutional arrangement. These decisions of the Bangladesh’s apex court found an implied legal regime established on constitutional morality. This showcases Bangladesh’s approach towards the recognition of universal obligations such as equality, dignity and life irrespective of the citizenship status. Worth mentioning is that this jurisprudential approach complies with the jus cogens norms of principles of international law, especially the principle of non-refoulement and protection from persecution. This also redefines Bangladesh’s diplomatic and moral integrity despite the vacuum of a formal refugee statute in the country.
Moral Obligation, Political Fatigue and ASEAN’s Role in Shared Responsibility
But in practice the scenario is divided between political pragmatism and moral obligation. Initially Bangladesh was accepting the Rohingyas with arms wide open and deep compassion, but with time and reducing amounts of aid, the tone has become harsher. Its frequent emphasis on ‘quick repatriation’ now demonstrates distress rather than principle. Also, Bangladesh is undervaluing the legal strengths for stateless protection substantiated by its own courts, by relying too much on temporary bilateral deals with Myanmar and ignoring rights-based framework of protection. Also, ASEAN’s stance through the principle of non-interference proceeds to negativize comprehensive and meaningful regional action. All the United Nations (UN) member states endorsed the principle of responsibility to protect, which asks states to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. This principle further underpins the fact that the international community must come forward when a state fails to safeguard its own people. From this perspective, if ASEAN ignores Myanmar’s crime as domestic affair, it compactly shares the burden of guilt or failure. Now, the ever-spreading Rohingya crisis turning into wider Rakhine conflicts, is not merely Myanmar’s shame; rather it is collective shame and a test of conscience for all the Southeast Asian countries belonging to ASEAN.
Paralysis of Global Conscience and The Citizenship Law: The Root to Statelessness
Unfortunately, the UN stays at the same juncture. Agencies of the UN work in both Myanmar and Bangladesh, but their activities are restricted due to political consent. Sometimes their engagements are too little and sometimes too much. Too much engagement leads to unsafe return and too little engagement means abandonment. Additionally, veto politics has extremely paralyzed the Security Council, by bestowing all liability to the slow grind of the International Court of Justice. The UN’s moral standpoint will be valued only if it assures no return of Rohingyas without proper security, designated rights and citizenship. Absent of meaningful action, the UN may serve as a diplomatic shield to mask continued persecution. Because to every noble action, the Citizenship Law 1982 of Myanmar remains a great barrier that eliminates Rohingyas from recognized ethnic groups and makes them stateless. Without the amendment of this law any repatriation would regenerate vulnerability and statelessness, be it under the Arakan Army or military junta. Pushing people back to their country of origin under such a law violates the conventions and principles of international law along with the very spirit of the Bangladeshi constitution. As the Sadaqat Khan Faqku, BNWLA and Farooque cases reflect, the country’s duty to protect extends beyond the identities and borders.
Towards a Dignified Return: Serving Justice before Repatriation
The predicament today is not merely between military rule or armed resistance; it is between expedience and legality, between the substance of justice and appearance of progress. The persecutors may be changed from army generals to armed guerrillas, but the fate of the Rohingyas stays tangled in the same hegemony; who are mere citizens of nowhere stuck between promises and peril. True repatriation of Rohingyas cannot be orchestrated via official announcements or photo-ops. It requires unflinching independent oversight by international agencies, regional cooperation, statutory protection in Bangladesh and accountability in Myanmar. The concept of return or repatriation will remain a cruel illusion and an aspiration generated for headlines denying reality if the above-stated conditions are not met. The Rohingya community deserves more than sympathy; they deserve the right to return, to live and to belong to their homes under legal protection rather than the shadow of war.
Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan, Assistant Professor (Law,) University of Information Technology and Sciences
Raspiatur Rashpi, Lecturer (Law), University of Chittagong
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