Blog post by Lauren McCarthy and Thaer Allaw
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in early 2025 has reshaped Syria’s political and security landscape, opening a window of opportunity for return among the displaced population. This moment carries symbolic weight, a long-awaited shift that could signal the beginning of recovery. Yet political change alone does not guarantee viable or sustainable return. The end of armed conflict marks the close of one chapter, but the path to reintegration remains obstructed by economic collapse, institutional fragility, and persistent security concerns.
As discussions on the scale and nature of investment required to support returnees and reconstruction begin to take shape, the need for coherence cannot be overstated. In recent years, global attention to durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons has grown, marked by the mandate of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement (2022–2024) and increased engagement in durable solutions by major UN actors and donors. In Syria, frameworks are in place, agencies are establishing their presence under new governance, and coordination structures are evolving. Yet critical questions remain: What is the prospect for large-scale development investment? And, how likely is inclusive governance? The extent to which these questions translate into concrete action on the ground will be telling of the country’s durable solutions outcomes, and ultimately the nature of the returnee experience. This blog explores these issues, aiming to inform current thinking on durable solutions strategies in Syria.
Return to the unknown
Of the three traditional solutions pathways, return is often framed as the ultimate goal; as a resolution to displacement. But return is not synonymous with reintegration. Nor does it automatically restore rights, dignity, or safety. For return to be meaningful in Syria, it must be supported by conditions that allow people not just to survive, but to rebuild. Recent intentions surveys indicated that just over half of IDP returnees and around 75% of refugee returnees intend to return to their original communities. For returnees that do not return to their communities of origin, and for those that do, the risk of continued displacement remains high.
Syria’s economic landscape remains deeply fractured. A recent World Bank report highlights the extent of devastation after 14 years of conflict, driven by sanctions, systemic disruptions, and the rise of informal and illicit economies. While modest growth is projected for 2025, recovery is uneven and largely concentrated in urban centers. Rural areas where many returnees originate continue to face neglect, with limited access to livelihoods, markets, and basic services. Many returnees, especially in rural and agricultural areas, lack any means of self-reliance. Limited access to livelihood opportunities constrains potential for Syrians to economically recover. Drought effects significantly compromise livelihood pathways for returnees who previously relied on agriculture and lack the means to re-establish themselves in other sectors.
Legal and institutional barriers further complicate reintegration. Many returnees lack civil documentation, face unresolved property disputes, and are excluded from restitution mechanisms. NRC’s May 2025 assessment found that 43% of surveyed returnees reported their homes were completely destroyed or uninhabitable, and around 40% lacked housing or ownership documents to reclaim property. In Aleppo and rural Damascus, thousands of hopeful returnees were re-displaced as a result. Without legal aid and transitional justice frameworks, return risks reinforcing inequality and exclusion. Social cohesion is fragile; years of conflict have fractured communities and eroded trust. In some cases, returnees face stigmatization or are perceived as politically affiliated, further undermining safety. New and old sectarian risks have also emerged following the regime change, and recent developments underscore the need for not merely inclusive, but highly context-specific approaches within durable solutions and development planning. The degree to which religious pluralism is protected and enforced by the new government will have profound effects on the ability of minority groups to remain in situ or make voluntary, safe and dignified mobility decisions.
Playing catch up
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) framework reminds us that durable solutions for internally displaced persons are only achieved when displacement-related vulnerabilities have been resolved. Yet in practice, return initiatives often proceed on the assumption that infrastructure, services, and the economy will eventually catch up, after people return. This sequencing gap, between planning, policy and reality, creates conditions for premature return and renewed cycles of displacement.
The global refugee regime bears part of this responsibility – in shaping the conditions under which return is pursued. Too often, return is promoted as a durable solution without adequate consideration of whether the necessary foundations; legal, economic, social, security, and environmental, are in place to support it. Host governments do not often connect policies encouraging return with the same level of commitment to investments in recovery. In Syria, where displacement is deeply rooted in structural and systemic failures, accelerated or politically driven return initiatives risk exposing individuals to renewed harm and continued displacement.
If durable solutions are to be meaningful, the government, and international actors must resist treating return as a convenient endpoint to displacement. Instead, return should be understood as a complex, long-term process requiring sustained investment, inclusive governance, and financial commitment. Decisions about when, how, and where return occurs must be led by Syrians themselves. The role of international actors is to enable this agency, through coherent, context-driven programming that reflects the realities and aspirations of displaced communities, rather than imposing externally defined timelines.
The costs of return
Development actors and donors have a critical role to play, not only in rebuilding infrastructure and revitalizing the economy, but in supporting inclusive governance, legal reform, and social cohesion. This engagement must go beyond technical fixes and short-term programming. It must be rooted in long-term strategies that prioritize equity, participation, and resilience. This includes investing in local institutions, supporting civil society, and ensuring that the needs of returnees, and potential returnees, are meaningfully included in planning and decision-making processes.
At the same time, the Syrian government bears central responsibility for creating the conditions necessary for safe, dignified return, and for mitigating patterns of displacement. This includes restoring public services, resolving property and documentation issues, ensuring legal protections, and fostering inclusive governance. Without a genuine commitment to reform and accountability, development efforts risk being undermined or rendered ineffective. Reintegration cannot be externally engineered; it must be nationally owned, locally driven, and responsive to the needs of displaced populations.
The constraints are significant. Large areas of land are no longer habitable due to drought, contamination, or repurposing for military and commercial use. Housing stock has been decimated, and essential services such as healthcare, education, water, and electricity remain either non-functional or inaccessible. Reconstruction is expensive and while the March 2025 Brussels Conference mobilized roughly $6 billion in pledges, the World Bank estimates at least $216 billion is needed to rebuild Syria. This gap raises critical questions about whether these resources will translate into meaningful support in return communities, and when such investments will materialize. The reality of these material conditions challenges the assumption that political transition alone can catalyze sustainable, scaled return. Without scaled up and coordinated investment, and without meaningful government leadership, the promise of return will remain fragile, an aspiration unsupported by the material conditions necessary for reintegration.
Making return work
A shift in how development actors and the Syrian government conceptualize and operationalize durable solutions is required. Durable solutions should be understood as a long-term process, one that demands sustained investment, inclusive governance, and careful consideration of the environmental and social realities shaping post-conflict Syria.
Common indicators to represent return, such as the number of returnees or area-based projects, or the provision of assistance packages, risk oversimplifying a complex process when not tied to broader, financed strategies. As the IASC Guidelines insist, measures of progress need to capture the realities of the returnee experience; perceptions of safety, security and integration, and measures of self-reliance and economic resilience that represent the longevity and quality of return.
The fall of Assad may open a political window for return, but it will not resolve the displacement crisis on its own. Reintegration must be understood as a multidimensional, long-term process requiring structural reform, inclusive governance, and sustained international support. Simplistic, sedentarist notions of return must give way to approaches that reflect the realities of protracted displacement: perceptions of risk, deep mistrust, and the new social and economic networks Syrian’s have built after years away from home. Without this shift, return risks becoming a revolving door, a temporary pause between phases of displacement.
If development actors, international donors and the Syrian government are serious about supporting durable solutions, symbolic gestures and short-term metrics must be replaced by substantive investment and systematic inclusion. This means creating conditions that allow returnees to rebuild—not just their homes, but their lives. It also requires humility and accountability: solutions must be shaped by those who have lived through displacement, not imposed upon them.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author/s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Refugee Law Initiative. We welcome comments and contributions to this blog – please comment below and see here for contribution guidelines.