Blog post by Dr. Özlem Gürakar Skribeland, Postdoctoral Reseacher, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo
In the past several years, the BEYOND Project has been exploring the relationship between the international refugee regime and non-signatory states to the Refugee Convention. As part of the BEYOND team, I have been studying Türkiye’s place in that regime. When I take a step back from the minute details of my legal research and look at my findings so far from a broader perspective, what I see can perhaps be described as a decline in multilateral governance on refugee issues in Türkiye in the past several years.
For example, my recent article on the Turkish Council of State’s engagement with international refugee law shows that the Court has been in engagement with the Refugee Convention for the past three decades, although the scope and effect of that engagement has been inconsistent. As I note in that article, however, the case law I studied provides some indication of a shift in the way the Turkish Council of State approaches asylum cases. First, what I call “real and substantive engagement with the Refugee Convention” seems to belong more to earlier years. Second, the Council of State appears to be moving from a starting position of holding United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assessments in high regard to one of deference to the assessments of the Turkish authorities. This aligns with a broader trend: national authorities seeking greater control over asylum matters. There is potential here for deeper research, especially through analysis of a wider pool of cases as well as interviews with legal professionals in Türkiye.
Another key focus of my research has been the relationship between the UNHCR and Türkiye. Archival material obtained from UNHCR archives in Geneva has been invaluable to this work, as it has to that of my BEYOND-colleagues. However, with High Commissioner Grandi warning of a one third reduction in UNHCR’s capacity due to funding cuts, we worry now about the fate of such critical archives. Aid cuts thus have far-reaching consequences, not only for refugee protection but also for the research that informs it. But going back to UNHCR-Türkiye relations, what I see in my research is that UNHCR-Türkiye relations have fluctuated considerably over the decades, with ups, downs, and ruptures. Importantly, we seem to be in a “down” period again.
In other words, this can be described as an inward-looking period in Türkiye’s relationship with the international refugee regime. In such a period, funding cuts are even more alarming. Here, I am not thinking solely of humanitarian aid in the narrow sense; I am concerned that cuts will lead to diminished capacity for the essential work done by nongovernmental organisations, such as monitoring, awareness raising, and advocacy. In other words, my concerns are around the creation of a climate with lower expectations of accountability, and fewer means to ensure it.
When it comes to implications for Türkiye’s large refugee population, all of this must be seen together with developments in Syria. Now that former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is gone, there is much expectation in Türkiye for Syrian refugees to return voluntarily. In a notable positive development, the Turkish authorities launched a “go and see” initiative at the end of 2024, allowing one person from each Syrian family to make up to three visits to Syria during the first six months of 2025, without losing their temporary protection status and legal rights in Türkiye. Turkish Minister of Interior announced in late May that 250,000 Syrians had voluntarily returned to Syria since 8 December 2024. I expect, however, that the vast majority of the Syrians in Türkiye –and elsewhere– will not choose to return, as Syria’s reconstruction will take considerable time, and they have already spent years adjusting to their new realities and establishing lives for themselves and their families in their host countries. What may happen then is concerning.
In recent years, there have been many allegations of refoulement from Türkiye to Syria, disguised as voluntary returns. In one such case, the European Court of Human Rights found Türkiye in violation of Articles 3, 5 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The individual in this case had been tricked into signing voluntary return papers and was removed to Syria without any opportunity to challenge their deportation. The combination of shrinking funds and increased political and societal expectation for returns could result in a rise in such practices. Monitoring this trend will be essential in the coming months.
Meanwhile, these developments must also be viewed in conjunction with changes in European Union (EU) law. The EU Migration Pact instruments place significant emphasis on non-entry, return, and cooperation with countries in the region for containment. While the interpretation of safe country rules was previously subject to much debate, the new rules under the Asylum Procedures Regulation make it clear, for example, that Türkiye’s geographical limitation to the Refugee Convention is not a barrier to being deemed a safe country for returns. The new rules will start applying from summer 2026. The EU is unlikely to welcome any increase in departures from the region or developments that could challenge Türkiye’s perceived “safety” for purposes of EU asylum law. This raises an open question: might the EU respond by increasing funding for refugees in the region, even if this is only for self-serving reasons?
There are many unanswered questions here, and we need to follow these developments closely.
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