Blog Post by Prof Özgür H. Çɪnar, University of Greenwich School of Law and Criminology. This post is part of the blog series on the application of refugee law in military service-related cases.
Introduction
Conscientious objection to military service is a way of taking a stand against war and compulsory military service for the sake of principles based on profound religious, conscience, political, ethical, moral, philosophical, humanitarian or similar convictions. Conscientious objectors, particularly in countries where there are no alternative services, find themselves stuck between their consciences and the compulsory duty imposed on them as citizens. Many objectors suffer accusations of cowardice and betrayal and are still subjected to discrimination and imprisonment or are forced to flee from their countries of birth.
In this paper, the main focus will be on the objectors who refuse to perform military service based on political conviction. In other words, it may be that a person’s claim stems from disagreement with his government as regards the justification for a particular military campaign. The first examples that come to mind are the American conscientious objectors, numbering around one hundred thousand, who opposed the Vietnam War, or the soldiers who refused to join the South Africa military or police forces on account of their disapproval of the apartheid regime.[1]
Military actions condemned by the International Community
Paragraph 170 of the UNHCR’s Handbook on Refugee Status[2] says: ‘[i]t is not enough for a person to be in disagreement with his government regarding the political justification for a particular military action.’ An objector on the grounds of political belief must meet another criterion from paragraph 171, that military action is ‘condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct.’ This wording would appear to exclude asylum claims from objectors in the U.S.A and other allied States during the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars.[3] In this respect, it should be noted that it is a moot point whether it is, in reality, possible for a conscientious objector to prove that a war is against of his/her conscience.
Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya note that, according to the Nuremberg principles, even if a person has had no part in the decision-making process, he can still be held responsible for acts that contravene international law. Consequently, an individual, to escape individual responsibility, cannot claim he was acting on orders.[4] Kurzas and other scholars also argue that this broadly accepted principle places a duty on individuals to ensure they take no part in military action if there is a probability that violations of human rights will occur.[5]
It is worth remembering that in times of war there are fundamentally two concepts of international law that are relevant: jus ad bellum concerns the rules on legality of the use of force as set forth in the UN Charter, while jus in bello relates to the means and methods of warfare. It is generally those in the higher echelons of government or the military who are held liable for violations of jus ad bellum, whereas for violations of jus in bello (commonly known as ‘war crimes’) soldiers and civilians may be held liable. This distinction has been important in determining whether a conscientious objector has acted in contravention of the ‘basic rules of human conduct’, since the authorities have been reluctant to consider evidence of violations of both concepts as relevant for determining refugee status.[6]
It is not clear from the text in the Handbook whether these ‘basic rules of human conduct’ include both jus in bello and jus ad bellum. However, the UNHCR’s Guidelines on Military Service[7], which are more up to date, confirm that the term refers to both concepts (para. 21). Although the concept of jus ad bellum is recognised, case law indicates that only high-ranking officers may make a claim for protection in violations of jus ad bellum.[8]
For instance, in the Hinzman and Hughey cases (Hinzman and Hughey v. Canada, A-182-06, A-185-06, 30 April 2007), American applicants sought refugee status in Canada. Their claim was based on the argument that U.S. military action in Iraq constituted a violation of international humanitarian law which was condemned by the international community as in contravention of basic rules of human conduct, indicating a conviction based on violations of jus ad bellum. They added that, on account of these violations of international humanitarian law, paragraph 171 of the Handbook stipulates that any punishment for refusing to take part in such conduct would be persecution (paras. 25, 30). Furthermore, they maintained that it would be unfairly onerous for them to have to provide evidence of their having committed a war crime.
The Immigration and Refugee Board found that violations of jus ad bellum were ‘not relevant’ as regards determining acts ‘contrary to basic rules of human conduct’ (Hinzman v Immigration and Refugee Board, File TA4-01429, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 16 March 2005, para. 10). The Canadian Federal Court did not accept this argument either, ruling that no evidence existed to demonstrate that the ‘breaches of international humanitarian law that have been committed by American soldiers in Iraq … rise to the level of being either systematic or condoned by the state.’ (Hinzman and Hughey v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 420, 31 March 2006, para. 189). Subsequently, in 2007 the Federal Court of Appeal (in Hinzman and Hughey v Canada (MIMA), 2007 FCA 171, 30 April 2007) and the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal (Hinzman and Hughey, Supreme Court of Canada, 50078, 15 November 2007). In the Hinzman judgment, violations of jus ad bellum were deemed to be ‘leadership crimes’, where only those in positions capable of planning, preparing, launching and waging wars could be held responsable (para. 142). As a ‘mere foot soldier’, Hinzman ‘could not be held to account for any breach of international law committed by the United States’. It was only ‘on the ground activities’ in which he would have had involvement, that were relevant as regards paragraph 171 (para. 188). Since Hinzman as a soldier could not be considered responsible for crimes against peace, the Court found that the evaluation concerned violations of jus in bello and not jus ad bellum. As he was not able to demonstrate his participation in a war crime his appeal was rejected. This decision has been seen as discriminatory, since it precludes ‘ordinary’ soldiers from claiming conscientious objection status on the grounds of jus ad bellum.[9]
In 2008, in Lebedev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2007) FC 728, (2008) 2 F.C.R. 585 (FC), the Court dwelt on the concept of ‘political expediency’. In this case it was very clear that a concern not to damage good relations with the U.S.A. Hence, a similar conclusión to that in the Hinzman case was arrived at.
In the U.S.A. the requirement for intent is given priority. Refugee status is granted to applicants who claim to be conscientious objectors on religious grounds and are members of religious groups who have suffered discrimination and/or been disproportionately punished (Canas-Segovia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992); Ilchuk v. Att. Gen. of the US, 434 F. 3d 618 (3rd Cir. 2006) and Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 385 F. 3d 1116 (7th Cir. 2004)). However, the applications of conscientious objectors based on grounds of political beliefs, in particular selective conscientious objectors who refuse to participate in certain conflicts, have generally been rejected. For instance, in the case of Gillette v United States (401 U.S. 437 (1971), the Court rejected the legitimacy of selective objection (paras. 437, 439). Another important point is that in the U.S.A. the outcome of asylum applications varies according to the period. During the Cold War – for instance in 1990 – 91.1% of Chinese applicants and 82.4% of applicants from the Soviet Union were approved, while only 2.5% of applications from El Salvador were successful.[10] As can be seen from these figures, political considerations and foreign policy have a prominent place in asylum applications.
In addition to the U.S.A and Canada other countries also take into account the political considerations and foreign policy. For instance, in 1974 the Finnish authorities extradited two conscientious objectors (Kozlov and Varfolomeyev) back to the Soviet Union in order not to jeopardise relations. Such decisions were frequently made. For instance, in the first decade of this century Finland rejected applications made from Ukraine.[11] The Norwegian Appeals Board also found the declaration made by a Russian conscientious objector who did not want to participate in military activity in Chechnya as insufficient grounds.[12]
It is regrettable that by questioning liability under international criminal law the standard of proof for conscientious objection has been raised, as a conscientious objector may consider himself morally responsible for his actions, regardless of any liability for them under international law.[13] Musalo also emphasises that refugee authorities and courts that condemn war crimes and genocide, while refusing to grant asylum to conscientious objectors who reject taking part in these actions, could be accused of hypocrisy.[14]
The Guidelines appears to reject the view that only high-ranking officers can make claims based on jus ad bellum. It emphasises that in a conflict considered to be in violation of jus ad bellum, it is not necessary that the applicant is at risk of incurring individual criminal responsibility’.[15] It is apparent that on this point the Guidelines lower the threshold, permitting all soldiers, of whatever rank, to make a claim of conscientious objection on the grounds of jus ad bellum. The EU’s Qualification Directive[16], indicates with regard to the exclusion clause in article 12(2), mentioning both ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against peace’ that violations of both jus in bello and jus ad bellum constitute grounds for asylum. However, the Directive does not make clear whether it agrees with the Hinzman decision as regards excluding those of a lower rank from making claims based on violations of jus ad bellum. In order to find the answer to this question, it is necessary to look at the latest developments regarding the content and interpretation of article 9(2)(e) in Shepherd, a preliminary ruling in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) from February 2015.[17]
A similar argument was made by André Shepherd, an American soldier (Andre Lawrence Shepherd v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C‑472/13, [2015]). He was seriously concerned about the effects of American armed action on the civilian population in Iraq. On 11 April 2007 Shepherd went Absent Without Leave (‘AWOL’) from his base in Germany. On 4 April 2011, Shepherd’s asylum application was denied by the German Immigration Court. He appealed this decision at the Bavarian US military action Administrative Court in Munich arguing among other things that under the Directive, he should not be returned to the U.S.A, where he would face persecution. In September 2013, the German court postponed the case in order to request an advisory opinion from the CJEU.[18]
In this case the Advocate General (AG) of the CJEU published an opinion saying that, according to Article 9, paragraph 2, military service did not only refer to combat personnel. The opinion emphasised that all military personnel should be covered by the definition, including helicopter maintenance mechanics. As regards whether a mechanic could participate in the carrying out of war crimes, the AG admitted it was hard to reach such a conclusion, on account of national authorities having to take into consideration acts and their effects that had yet to be committed/determined.[19] Thus, the CJEU referred this case back to the German Court on 25 February 2015 saying ‘it was its duty to prove whether U.S. soldiers were committing war crimes in Iraq and whether Shepherd risked being involved in such crimes if he went’.[20] The CJEU decided it was possible that war crimes had been committed. However, rather worryingly, it continues by saying that ‘an armed intervention engaged upon on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Security Council offers, in principle, every guarantee that no war crimes will be committed’ and that the same applies ‘to an operation which gives rise to an international consensus’ (para. 41). It appears that the Court is implying that when there is international consensus, there is a limited possibility that war crimes will be perpetrated, an implication that obviously raises the standard of proof required and makes it extremely difficult for protection to be granted on the grounds of article 9(2)(e). Much like in paragraph 171 of the Handbook we can observe a tendency to rely on politically influenced opinions of the international community, rather than focusing on a case-by-case assessment.[21] On 16 November 2016, the German Administrative Court turned down Shephard’s application for asylum (European Bureau for Conscientious Objectors.
To sum up, despite these recent clarifications, it is evident that both jus in bello and jus ad bellum are relevant as regards the assessment of claims for conscientious objection. The usual meaning of ‘human conduct’ may seem closer to jus in bello, as it relates to the conduct of the parties engaged in a conflict. However, since refugee law exists to protect the refugee, claims based on jus ad bellum should not be excluded on account of this wording. It should not be concluded that a person otherwise prepared to engage in combat cannot believe that it would be wrong to fight in a war that is a violation of jus ad bellum. Solely because these violations are normally seen as the responsibility of state or military leaders should not prevent conscientious objectors of all ranks from making claims based on violations of jus ad bellum. Moreover, the CJEU’s suggestion that war crimes are unlikely to be committed when a military operation is supported by international consensus, demonstrates an alarming naivety regarding the conduct of armed conflicts.
What standard of proof to be shown
At this point, a closely related question comes to mind: to what degree would a conscientious objector be required to take part in such ‘inhumane’ acts, and what standard of proof, if any, would be applied. Paragraph 171 of the Handbook does not refer to proof of personal or direct participation, only requiring that the applicant ‘does not wish to be associated with’ the acts in question. Unfortunately, it appears that adjudicators have misinterpreted this clause, and demand examination of the likelihood of participation in such acts.[22]
For instance, the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board refused an application made by a group of Israeli soldiers, citing a lack of proof of a ‘real risk’ of participation in actions that violated international law.[23] In the UK, the burden of proof has been lowered to ‘might require’ (para. 8), in Sepet v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2003] UKHL 15), whilst the Court of Appeal attempted to offer a concrete test by asking whether soldiers ‘may be required on a sufficiently widespread basis’ to act in contravention of humanitarian norms (Krotov v. Secretary of the State for the Home Department ([2004] EWCA (Civ) 69, [2004] 1 WLR 1825), para. 51).[24]
In addition, the controversial issue in the Krotov case was the question as to whether the conflict in Chechnya had been condemned as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct by the international community (Krotov, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 69, para. 9). The IAT noted that ‘[t]here is nothing to show that the current conflict in Chechnya has been condemned by any official international body, either as to aims or methods’ (Krotov, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 69, para. 11). The IAT consequently dismissed an appeal on 2 May 2002, after which Krotov went to the Court of Appeal, pointing out that paragraph 171 of the Handbook requires only that ‘the international community had condemned the type of military action with which the individual did not wish to be associated as being contrary to basic rules of human conduct’ (Krotov, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 69, para. 11).
The Court of Appeal accepted the appeal and returned the case to the IAT on 11 February 2004 (para. 54). The IAT subsequently granted asylum to Krotov on 29 October 2004 (Krotov [AK (Russia-Chechnya deserter)] v. Secretary of the State for the Home Department, [2004] UKIAT 00294, 29 October 2004). The Court, taking into consideration reports compiled by national and international government and non-government organisations, came to the following conclusion:
the evidence shows that breaches of the basic rules of human conduct are sufficiently widespread that it should be inferred that the Appellant was at a real risk of being required to participate in such acts in the broad sense described, that he would have been formally or informally punished for any refusal to do so and that fear of the consequences was a significant part of his claim for asylum (para. 31).
In short, to demand a high burden of proof would be contrary to the purpose of refugee law, which is to offer safeguards to individuals who have a well-founded fear of persecution. Furthermore, once it has been accepted that violations of international standards are generally the reason for refugee movement, this by itself should be sufficient grounds for those who do not want to participate in such acts, rather than raising the bar.[25] Musalo also notes that the UNHCR Handbook makes clear that all the conscientious objector needs to demonstrate is that he is sincere when he refuses to take part in human rights violations or abuses, without having to provide absolute proof of his own personal participation in such violations.[26] It is unfortunate that states and international bodies have demanded an evidence in cases of conscientious objection.[27] For instance, the Guidelines seek a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of participation in contraventions of international law, threshold higher than in Sepet and Krotov.[28] In other words, the Guidelines require a certain degree of proof of personal participation, even though there is no requirement mentioned in paragraph 171 of the Handbook.
In this respect, there is also another issue worthy of attention in these decisions. The right of asylum for individuals who refuse to perform military service on account of international condemnation of a conflict seems to be undermined by the reluctance of national and international bodies to reach judgments against other states regarding such conflicts. There should be serious concern about the fact that decisions are frequently influenced by political/diplomatic relations or economic reasons rather than by international norms. This leads to national governments being disinclined to use condemnatory language for fear of upsetting such relations.[29] The cases mentioned above highlight this state of affairs, as do instances of American objectors who sought asylum during the Vietnam War. In most of these cases, states opted to hand out temporary residence permits rather than granting asylum under the Refugee Convention.[30]
As a result of political/diplomatic relations or economic reasons Courts have generally used similar wording in their decisions, declaring that ‘there is no evidence that violations of international humanitarian law have been committed by the [American, British, Russian, Turkish] soldier in [Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Turkey etc.].’[31]
Conclusion
It is evident that the typical practice in asylum cases has been to give priority to political/diplomatic considerations, ignoring the pertinent fact that conscientious objectors would suffer persecution if they refused to violate their conscience by performing military service.[32] The judgments referred to above demonstrate clearly that domestic courts have evaluated applicants’ refusals to join the military on political grounds, but have failed to take into consideration the key issue of conscience. However, there is no doubt that when a person is obliged to perform military service contrary to his genuine belief, the freedom of conscience is violated in the public sphere. Hence, if a person is opposed to the military actions of the state of which he is a citizen, he will find himself on the horns of a dilemma as regards his conscience and the possible punishment consequent on his opposition. As any punishment would constitute a violation of his conscience, it is wrong to put asylum seekers in a position where they have to make a choice between imprisonment and violating their conscience.[33]
It is noteworthy that Articles 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR specifically recognise the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, although none of these documents refer explicitly to the right to conscientious objection. In contrast, this right has been discussed by UN mechanisms since the 1950s and the UN and the European (e.g. ECtHR, EU) mechanisms now recognise the right to freedom of conscientious objection as a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.[34] The right to conscientious objection has a close relationship to the forum internum and forum externum dimensions of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.[35] In 2011 the HRC published its latest opinion regarding the right to conscientious objection,[36] addressing this right with reference to the forum internum aspect. The HRC’s recognition of the forum internum aspect makes it absolutely clear that states have no right to intervene in the inner being of conscientious objectors, whatever the circumstances. In this latest opinion the HRC emphasised the fact that an individual alone has the right to determine his/her own destiny. As a result of this conclusion, the right to conscientious objection as part of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion is now recognised as an absolute and non-derogable right.
In conclusion, it is the case that international recognition of the right to conscientious objection itself renders necessary the granting of asylum to conscientious objectors. The Refugee Convention should be seen as a living instrument and interpreted in the light of contemporary circumstances.[37] Indeed, the Refugee Convention declares that any attempts with the purpose of forcing individuals to act contrary to their beliefs, such as torture or incarceration, should be deemed persecution.[38] Apart from the Refugee Convention, as can be seen in the other instruments which were examined above, although there is not complete harmony amongst them, in the event of the right to conscientious objection not being accepted in their own countries, the right to asylum should be recognised. The Handbook, the Guidelines and the EU’s Qualification Directive support such a solution. A radical change is needed in the practice of many countries where priority is given to political/diplomatic considerations rather than to compliance with international norms. Hence, this radical change is in fact entirely interrelated to the obligation arising from international law of states to protect the rights and freedoms of everyone in their jurisdictions (Article 2 of ICCPR; Article 1 of ECHR). There exists an obligation for states to protect these rights and freedoms in a practical and effective way in accordance with the standards of international law.[39] In this context it is evident that such a change in practice would be important as regards international mechanisms such as the EU, Council of Europe and UN having a deterrent effect on member states.
[1] J. Walch, ‘Aid to Military Refugees: the case of Sweden’ (War Resistance 3, 1974), 27-28; A. Eide & C. Mubanga-Chipoya, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, (New York and Geneva: UN Publication, 1983), para. 126.
[2] ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Con- vention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’ was published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees in 1979. It was re-edited in 1992, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1.
[3] K. J. Kuzas, ‘Asylum for Unrecognized Conscientious Objectors to Military Service: Is There a Right Not to Fight?’, Virginia Journal of International Law 31 (1990-1991), p. 460.
[4] A. Eide & C. Mubanga-Chipoya, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, (New York and Geneva: UN Publication, 1983), paras. 51,128.
[5] Kuzas, p. 461; Letter from Joachim Henkel (30 January 1986) to Karen Musalo in K. Musalo, ‘Swords into Ploughshares: Why the United States Should Provide Refuge to Young Men Who Refuse to Bear Arms for Reasons of Conscience’. San Diego Law Review 26 (1989), p. 870; The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights (1980) Conscientious Objection as a Human Right., (New York: Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, 1980), p. 9; C. D. de Jong, The Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion or Belief in the United Nations (1946-1992), (Antwerpen/Groningen/Oxford: Intersentia, 2000), pp. 178-179.
[6] Ingeborg Skancke Karlsnes, ‘Under What Circumstances May Conscientious Objection to Military Service be a Ground for Refugee Status?’ (Master’s thesis, Bergen University, 2015), p. 36.
[7] Guidelines on International Protection No. 10, HCR/GIP/13/10/Corr. 1, 12 November 2014.
[8] Karlsnes, 36.
[9] Cecilia M. Bailliet, ‘Assessing Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello Within the Refugee Status Determination Process: Contemplations on Conscientious Objectors Seeking Asylum’, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 20 (2005-2006), p. 373.
[10] Corii D. Berg, ‘The Conscientious Objector Applying for Political Asylum: Forced to Bear Arms and the Brunt of M.A.A26851062 v. INS, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 139 (1991), paras. 163-164.
[11] ‘Finland’s history of forced returns: Deporting Conscientious objectors and a sedated family’, Yle Uuutiset, 13.04.2017, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/finlands_history_of_forced_returns_deporting_conscientious_objectors_and_a_sedated_family/9564745
[12] Bailliet, p. 356.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Musalo, p. 870.
[15] The Guidelines, para. 23
[16] EU Qualification Directive 2004/83, 29 April 2004.
[17] Karlsnes, pp. 37-38.
[18] European Bureau for Conscientious Objectors, Annual Report: Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Europe 2014, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c00acde4b022a64cd0266b/t/5506eedfe4b0b39d3c23b846/1426517727250/2014-EBCO-REPORT-EUROPE.pdf
[19] Press Release, Court of Justice, No. 147/14.
[20] German Court Rejects US Soldier’s Asylum Application, Deutsche Welle, 17 November 2016,
http://www.dw.com/en/german-court-rejects-us-soldiers-asylum-application/a-36428165
[21] Karlsnes, p. 39.
[23] Andreas Zimmermann, Felix Machts and Jonas Dörschner (eds.), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 433; see also, Karlsnes, p. 40.
[24] Karlsnes, p. 40.
[25] Karlsnes, p. 40.
[26] Musalo, p. 869.
[27] Musalo, p. 76; Bailliet, p. 367.
[28] The Guidelines, para. 26.
[30] See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150, adopted on 28 July 1951, entered into force on 22 April 1954 and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, adopted on 31 January 1967, entered into force on 4 October 1967.
[31] For example, Krotov, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 69, 2004 1. W.L.R. 1825, para. 2 (citing Krotov, [2002] C1/2002/1537/IATRF, para. 25).
[32] M. Lippman, ‘The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an International Human Right’. California Western International Law Journal 21 (1990-1991), pp. 40-41; Baillet, p. 354.
[33] Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2007), p. 114.
[34] For example, HRC, General Comment no. 22 and the judgment of Yeo-Bum Yoon and Mr Myung-Jin Choi v. the Republic of Korea, Communication nos: 1321/2004 and 1322/2004, 3 November 2006, CCPR/C/88/D/1321-1322/2004.
[35] See, for example, Yeo-Bum Yoon and MrMyung-Jin Choi v. the Republic of Korea; Eu-min Jung, et. al. v. the Republic of Korea, Communication nos: 1593 to 1603/2007, 23 March 2010, CCPR/C/98/D/1593-1603/2007.
[36] See Min-Kuy Jeong et. al. v. the Republic of Korea, Communication nos: 1741/2007, 1642/2007, 24 March 2011.
[37] R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Shah, [1997] Imm. A.R. 145; see also Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 28957/9535, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 18 (2002), para. 74.
[38] See Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. See also T. Malik, International Refugee Law: A Lexicon of Principles & Issues, (Bangladesh Bar Council: Legal Education & Training Institute, 1998), pp. 80-82.
[39] Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para. 87; See also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘Refugees and their human rights’, The RSC Working Paper Series 17 (2004): p. 4.
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