Blog post by Dr Daryna Dvornichenko, British Academy Researcher at Risk Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.
As Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine continues in its fourth year, questions about the future of forcibly displaced* Ukrainians take on new urgency. Even if U.S. President Donald Trump fulfills his promise to broker a ceasefire in 2025, how will a peace deal affect the millions of Ukrainians who now live outside their home country?
By the end of July 2024, nearly 6.2 million Ukrainian refugees were registered across Europe, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This marks the largest displacement crisis since World War II, with nearly a third of Ukraine’s population forced to flee their homes. Additionally, 571,000 Ukrainians are living outside Europe, bringing the global total of forcibly displaced Ukrainians to more than 6.7 million.
As a result of military service requirements for men in Ukraine, the vast majority of those displaced are women, children, and to a lesser extent, elderly people. In some host countries, including Italy, Poland, Estonia and the United Kingdom (UK), the share of women among adult displaced Ukrainians exceeded 80% in 2023, a 10% decrease from the previous year. However, as time passes and those who fled the war start to plan for the long term, the question of whether displaced Ukrainians intend to stay in their host country or return to their homeland becomes more important.
The intention to stay or return is usually volatile and liable to change based on different circumstances in the refugees’ home and host countries. A clearer understanding of displaced Ukrainians’ intentions to stay or return to Ukraine will enable the more effective planning, development and implementation in host countries of targeted and gender-sensitive measures aimed at building refugees’ skills without hampering their possible return to Ukraine once the situation allows it.
Return or Stay?
The salient point when it comes to the question of forcibly displaced Ukrainians is that, as years have passed and expectations of the duration of the war have changed, they have started planning their lives abroad with a stay of more than a few months in mind. Survey data shows that refugee opinion in this regard started changing in summer 2022, shortly after the war began.
Since the vast majority of displaced Ukrainians are women and children—with a large proportion of female caregivers acting as primary breadwinners—surveys of forcibly displaced Ukrainians amplify mainly women’s voices. The ratio between the number of females and males in some surveys is 9 to 1.
The first surveys of forcibly displaced Ukrainians showed a large number were eager to return to Ukraine. The survey, conducted by Kyiv-based research company 4Service Group from 28 March to 4 April 2022 in 36 countries, showed that 89% of respondents planned to return home after the end of the war. Such high numbers of those who stated at the beginning of the war that they were planning to return home as soon as the security situation allowed can be partially explained by generally optimistic views in Ukraine on the duration of the war.
A survey conducted in Ukraine two weeks after the start of Russia’s invasion showed that 39% of respondents were sure that victory would be a matter of a few weeks, while another 18% of respondents believed the war would end within several months. Meanwhile, 6% believed that victory required six months to a year and only 3% believed it would take more than a year. In a different survey in Ukraine in August 2022—roughly six months into the conflict— 1% of respondents believed that victory over Russia was possible within a week, 40% said it would take six months to a year, 20% said more than a year, and 20% said several months.
Overall, surveys conducted among forcibly displaced Ukrainians within the first 6 months of the war show an uncertainty shared by those fleeing the war abroad about the future, preventing them from making long-term plans. Around 10% reported that they were undecided about their future plans in July 2022 compared to 17% between late August and early September of that year.
As the war continued in 2023, the number of those who wanted to return to Ukraine had declined significantly compared to the previous spring. The hope for a short-term war faded entirely. Russia’s attacks on power grids between autumn 2022 and winter 2023 resulted in a new wave of migration. Non governmental organisations working with forcibly displaced Ukrainians in neighbouring countries reported a significant increase in the number of displaced persons by the end of October 2023.
Most studies conducted in 2023 showed that the percentage of those who planned to return to Ukraine did not exceed 50%. According to a survey conducted by the Ukrainian research agency Info Sapiens between April and May 2023 and commissioned by the Centre for Economic Strategy, 41% of Ukrainians living abroad at the time planned to return to Ukraine and 22% indicated they were likely to return. However, it is unclear whether all of them would actually return. According to Rating Lab’s Pan-European Study of Ukrainians in Europe conducted a few weeks later in July , 49% of Ukrainians who moved after the invasion said they would not like to keep living abroad. This was also the case among Ukrainians who moved to Europe before the invasion (40%). Meanwhile, almost 20% of Ukrainians hesitated with the decision to return or stay, and the rest were thinking about staying permanently abroad.
The third year of the war , 2024, marked a significant decrease in the number of those who were planning to return to Ukraine. In an April 2024 survey from the UK ’s Office of National Statistics, 68% of respondents said they intended to continue living in the UK even if they felt that it was safe to return to Ukraine. This was notably higher than the previous year (52%). Better employment opportunities (60%), having a job in the country (52%) and staying with their family (44%) were among Ukrainians’ top reasons for wanting to remain in the UK. A separate survey that the EU’s Agency for Asylum conducted in 2024 with arriving migrants from Ukraine also showed a considerable drop in the number of Ukrainians who planned to return: only 20% of respondents were determined to do so, with 14% leaning towards returning—a significant decline compared to 2023.
Pull and Push Factors
The longer the war goes on , the more Ukrainians may adapt to life abroad. However, no matter how safe and stable life abroad may seem , there exist several ‘pull factors’ that are enticing people to return to Ukraine. Among these, the most common are improved safety in Ukraine, reunification with families and employment, as well as intangible factors such as homesickness.
According to the results of the first round of UNHCR’s Intentions Survey conducted in July 2022, the main reason for wanting to return was the feeling that the security situation had improved (40%), followed by economic reasons (32%) and a desire to reunite with family members (12%). For roughly a quarter of respondents, the plan to return was driven by economic reasons and the need to access basic services. Findings from the second round of the survey conducted between August and September 2022 revealed that improved safety and security conditions in Ukraine would help the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian respondents (91%) make a decision on whether to return or not. This was followed by ‘confidence in finding work opportunities.’ In May 2023, at the border in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Oblast, UNHCR conducted a study on the reasons behind forcibly displaced Ukrainians’ return. A third of respondents in that study also indicated that their primary motive was family reunification, while 66% wished to live in their own cultural environment.
Another important, though intangible pull factor that significantly impacts an individual’s plans to return is the simple fact that they miss home. Compared to other psychological factors, homesickness has the largest effect, significantly increasing one’s desire to return to Ukraine, according to a 2023 survey conducted by the Rating sociological group on behalf of American University Kyiv. However, it is unclear whether homesickness could be a predictor of return for people whose homes were significantly damaged or even destroyed in Ukraine.
When it comes to deciding to stay or return to Ukraine, t he role of ‘push factors’ should not be underestimated. Issues in a host country, including a lack of housing or difficulties in finding housing and a lack of employment opportunities—combined with lack of access to childcare—can make people want to return to Ukraine, which is a more familiar environment. Moreover, the role that these factors play in one’s decision may increase over time. First, people may be more willing to accept inadequate living conditions in recipient countries in the short term but not in the long term. Second, the social benefits that were offered to forcibly displaced Ukrainians in the first weeks and months after Russia’s full-scale invasion have been drastically reduced, making it difficult for a person who does not have a full-time job to survive.
At large, security problems were the main factor that drove people out of Ukraine, while the standard of living in the EU acted as a pull factor due to the bloc’s offering of temporary protection status and other benefits. However, there is also an opposite dynamic at play: Improving the perception of security at home can be a factor that makes Ukraine more attractive, while difficulties in ensuring an adequate standard of living can be a factor that drives people out of the EU or back to Ukraine.
EU pull factors dominate when it comes to more vulnerable groups in need of special help. The EU has better health care systems, including facilities for children with special needs, as well as better conditions for people with chronic diseases and life-threatening diseases such as cancer. The factors of attraction to the EU also dominate among young people who do not have their own family or need to take care of family members in Ukraine, including students and people without partners. For example, a 2023 study of social, economic and societal participation of forcibly displaced Ukrainians in Germany showed that those seeking education or training were 11% more likely to want to stay in Germany permanently than those who were not employed. Improved German language skills were also positively correlated with the intention to stay in Germany permanently; another reason for wanting to stay in the EU for such people was the opportunity to economically support relatives living in Ukraine.
Other Factors
The return intentions of forcibly displaced Ukrainians also vary greatly depending on their host country’s proximity to Ukraine. Generally, those living in countries neighbouring Ukraine reported having plans and hopes to return to Ukraine more often than those living in European countries farther away. According to UNHCR’s Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees and IDPs from Ukraine survey conducted in July 2023, displaced Ukrainians living in countries neighbouring Ukraine were more likely in the short term to plan to return permanently (16%) compared to those living in other countries in Europe (13%). In particular, return intentions in the short term were highest among those living in Moldova (21%) and Poland (17%). In the mid and long term, forcibly displaced Ukrainians livingin countries neighbouring Ukraine were more likely to report having hopes to return (71%) than those living in other European countries (57%), while those living in non-neighbouring European countries reported more often than their counterparts to be undecided about returning (24% vs 8%).
The possibility to stay depended not only on desires, but also on other circumstances, including education and the availability of housing and work, as well as residence permits, opportunities for children to study and changes in personal circumstances. The desire to stay or return was also related to gender, age and the age of children: men were significantly more inclined to stay in Ukraine than women. Ukrainians with school-age children were also more likely to think about staying. Older women wanted to return home the most; it was probably more difficult for them to adapt, find a job, learn the language and expand their social circle.
High levels of corruption in Ukraine, meanwhile, may have significantly discouraged the return of displaced Ukrainians. Most Ukrainians staying in Europe believed that Ukraine loses a lot to European countries when it comes to corruption. Some 84 % of displaced Ukrainians surveyed in July 2023 believed that the level of corruption in Ukraine is much higher than in the rest of Europe, with just 3% believing the opposite. Because of the corruption in their country of origin, Ukrainians who have adapted to the less corrupt society of their new country may feel alienated from their homeland and decide not to return—this may be especially true for women, who are much more vulnerable to the negative consequences of domestic corruption. It is women who generally come into contact with service providers more and suffer more if certain corruption claims are made against them—a fact that was confirmed by the results of a survey conducted by Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme in Ukraine before Russia’s 2022 invasion.
Additionally, sociologists note that the existence of different attitudes among Ukrainians who stayed in the country and those who fled could become another factor that influences forcibly displaced Ukrainians’ decision to stay abroad. A research experiment conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in September 2022 revealed that while attitudes towards all groups of displaced Ukrainians are generally positive— 90% of respondents expressed sympathy while only 5% condemned displaced Ukrainians’ decision to leave their country— there are also some differences, primarily depending on the gender and family background status of forcibly displaced Ukrainians. When it comes to a mother with minor children whose husband stayed in Ukraine, 90% of respondents supported her choice to leave and 6% condemned it. With regard to a single young woman without children, support dropped to 87% and condemnation rose to 9%. In the case of elderly men—for example, a 72-year-old professor—support dropped to 83% and condemnation increased to 10%. Finally, when it came to ‘a 31-year-old male migrant worker who was in Poland when the war started and decided to stay,’ 75% supported his choice while 19% condemned it.
Overall, different experiences of different groups of displaced Ukrainians and the different perceptions of them at home can create the risk of stratification along the lines of, ‘where were you and what did you do to contribute to Ukraine’s victory? ’ Without the development of a reconciliation policy targeting those who left Ukraine and those who stayed, the number of social conflicts will only increase, acting as another reason for displaced Ukrainians not to
return.
Conclusion
The aforementioned surveys show that with each passing month of the war, the number of Ukrainians who decide to stay in Europe has increased. The dynamics of push and pull factors are also changing. Hoping for a quick end to the war, people tend to notice the positive aspects of returning home (family reunification, a familiar social and cultural context, more stable housing and, in some cases, employment) and the negative aspects of living abroad (insufficient social protection and unfamiliar social and cultural contexts). However, as one’s hopes for a quick end to the war fall, so too does motivation. Class differences between more mobile and confident middle-class Ukrainians and more vulnerable groups with fewer opportunities could also become more pronounced.
As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues and displaced Ukrainians face prolonged stays in their host countries, the question of when and how they will return becomes increasingly complex. For many, especially those from severely damaged border regions or areas in Ukraine that have experienced significant destruction, returning to their former homes may no longer be an option—those homes have effectively ceased to exist. Others grapple with the trauma of extreme violence, making the prospect of return a trigger for distressing memories.
For a significant number of displaced Ukrainians, especially those benefiting from temporary protection abroad, returning to Ukraine could mean confronting not just the loss of their original homes, but a new form of displacement—this time, within their own country. Given the inadequate support provided to internally displaced people (IDP) in Ukraine, becoming an IDP may seem like an increasingly unfavourable choice.
Moreover, personal circumstances play a critical role. For some, staying abroad offers an escape not only from the war but from abusive relationships, or it provides access to essential medical treatment for children and relatives with chronic conditions or special needs—services that are currently disrupted in Ukraine due to the conflict. Ukrainian men who are living outside the country may be particularly hesitant to return, fearing compulsory mobilization under Ukraine’s military recruitment laws, regardless of their fitness and readiness for combat.
In summary, applying differentiated approaches specifically targeted to diverse groups of displaced Ukrainians in different circumstances seems the only feasible option to determine the pace of repatriation. Ukrainians currently abroad will need to know how and if they will be able to stay in Europe so that they can plan their lives, making it essential to ensure certainty regarding their further stay. Host countries’ development of tailored repatriation programs that maximise ‘pull factors,’ , and at the same time ensure essential rights of forcibly displaced Ukrainians, should start now.
*The term “forcibly displaced” is used to describe anyone who has fled Ukraine due to the 2022 invasion by the Russian Federation. This reflects their circumstances rather than their specific legal status; some have applied for asylum and received refugee status, but the majority hold other legal statuses— namely temporary protection. This forcibly displaced population includes both Ukrainian nationals and nationals of other countries who lived in Ukraine (third-country nationals).
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