Blog post by Dr Meltem Ineli Ciger, Associate Professor, Suleyman Demirel University, Türkiye.
“The fall of the Assad regime gives hope to the Syrian people. The hope of returning to their homes and rebuilding their lives. It is the most natural feeling there is. However, the lack of predictability demands utmost caution. Therefore, one thing is very clear: All returns must be voluntary, safe, and dignified.”
Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, 17 December 2024
The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria created a new and complex question for countries hosting Syrian refugees: Is it time for them to return? With more than twelve million Syrians forcibly displaced in the region alone, the end of Assad’s rule represents a new possibility. However, as hopeful as this moment may seem, it remains premature to forcibly return Syrian refugees. The UNHCR’s latest position is clear: Syria is not yet safe. Ongoing violence, explosive remnants of war, and mass humanitarian needs still plague the country. Over sixteen million Syrians depend on assistance amidst a shattered economy, destroyed homes, and unresolved property disputes— a reality that no displaced person can simply return to. Yet, per Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, return to one’s country of origin is a fundamental human right, and spontaneous returns to Syria are happening daily. For those who wish to go back, it is crucial to ensure safe and dignified returns. Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes, which are often expanded to include reintegration as Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes, offer a way forward, but what does history teach us about their effectiveness?
To answer this question, this blog post examines the return of Bosnian refugees after the war in the 1990s, identifying key lessons and good practices concerning assisted voluntary returns. It explores what states can learn from this experience as they develop AVRR programmes for forcibly displaced populations—particularly large-scale initiatives—once conditions allow for safe and dignified return. The identification of these good practices is based on my own research on assisted return programmes developed following the end of temporary protection regimes, as well as the existing body of literature on AVRs from the 1990s, in particular, the return of Bosnian refugees (cf. Koser, Walsh, Black 1998; Black 2002; Gorman and Kibreab 1996; Van Selm 1998; Onken’s 2005 chapter in this book; Yakoob 1999; Hathaway and Neve 1997).
Learning From History: The Bosnian Experience
To give context, the Bosnian conflict officially ended in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Accords, a series of agreements that secured all refugees and displaced persons the right to freely return to their homes of origin. However, many difficulties remained even after the end of the war, which precluded Bosnians’ return to their homes. These challenges arose from the ethnic homogenization of regions established under the Dayton Accords, persistent ethnic tensions, a severe shortage of housing, ongoing security concerns, the widespread presence of landmines, and the devastated post-war Bosnian economy. In response to these formidable obstacles, UNHCR emphasised in 1994 the need to adopt alternative policies, including the implementation of “practical arrangements for repatriation, reintegration, and rehabilitation in the country of origin when and if conditions permit.” States hosting Bosnian refugees introduced assisted return schemes in cooperation with UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Richard Black defines assisted return programmes as “the provision of direct financial assistance for the return itself and projects that assisted in the dissemination of information about conditions for return.” In the Bosnian context, various practices fell under the concept of assisted returns. First, these schemes provided information about the situation in the country of origin to Bosnians who wished to return. Second, Denmark and Sweden implemented ‘look and see’ visits, allowing Bosnians to temporarily return and assess for themselves whether it was safe to return for good. Third, in addition to these visits, financial support was offered by states and sometimes international or national organisations to individuals or households to facilitate travel and reintegration into their country of origin.
States hosting Bosnian refugees also facilitated the repatriation process and encouraged returns by rebuilding the infrastructure of the country of origin. For example, Germany and some other European states contributed to the reconstruction of Bosnian towns, while theSwiss governmentworked with Bosnian NGOs to rehabilitate schools, government buildings and local infrastructures to make voluntary repatriation sustainable. Meanwhile, the Austrian government rebuilt the homes of elderly Bosnians and contributed to the running costs of the houses for five years. According to this 2002 study by Black, the offer of housing reconstruction was a significant incentive for Bosnians to return.
One of the notable programmes facilitating the return of Bosnians was the Return of Qualified Nationals (RMP), administered by IOM. The RMP programme specifically targeted skilled Bosnians whose expertise was essential for the reconstruction and development of the country. Building on this model, IOM has since implemented similar programmes for Afghans, Kosovars, and other displaced groups. These initiatives combine various reintegration measures – including arranging flights, providing financial assistance for education, vocational training, job placement, and support to acquire necessary equipment and supplies – to establish small businesses. The success of these programmes highlights the crucial role of international organisations, notably IOM and UNHCR, in designing and implementing effective policies to support sustainable returns and reintegration processes.
Key lessons and Good Practices for Developing Effective AVR Programmes
In the case of post-war Bosnia, assisted return schemes were implemented individually by states rather than through an interstate approach. To enhance their impact, however, a more coordinated and collective strategy is needed. The case of Bosnia offers valuable lessons for mass influx situations where, despite the resolution of the root cause (e.g. an end to armed conflict), various barriers to return remain. The key question is: what measures and policies can states adopt to facilitate and support voluntary repatriation and the reintegration of displaced groups? Here are some answers:
- States must provide accurate, up-to-date information about conditions in the country and region of origin. This can include details about safety, specific areas of return, government assurances and their scope. Such transparency allows displaced persons to make informed decisions.
- Under assisted return schemes, explanatory visits can be organised to enable individuals to assess the situation in their country of origin before deciding to return. It is crucial that those who explore the possibility of return can come back to the host states after these visits.
- States can provide financial support for transportation and initial reintegration needs. Innovative solutions such as repatriation accounts, deducted from salaries when displaced persons were working in the host state/s and transferable upon return, can encourage voluntary returns while safeguarding their financial contributions (cf. Yakoob 1999).
- Financial and material support for rebuilding homes, schools, farms and public infrastructure is critical. Engaging returnees in the reconstruction process accelerates their reintegration and economic recovery.
- Host states can offer vocational training and educational opportunities to prepare displaced persons for labour market demands in their country of origin. This empowers returnees and ensures they contribute effectively to rebuilding efforts.
- Promoting dialogue between displaced communities and those who remained in the country of origin fosters social cohesion. Robert F. Gorman and Gaim Kibreab propose conducting surveys among temporary protection beneficiaries and the communities that stayed in the country of origin. These surveys can gather information on the place of origin, reasons for flight, property left behind, skills, and social networks. Analysing this data may help to identify the social, cultural and economic dynamics between those who were displaced and those who remained, address potential tensions and enhance the effectiveness of return schemes.
These measures, when implemented collectively and efficiently, can help address barriers to return and support sustainable reintegration. As Gorman and Kibreab emphasise, the durability of return is dependent on addressing the root causes of displacement and ensuring adequate administrative capacity. A coordinated approach involving states, UN agencies and international organisations is essential for the success of AVR programmes.
The Path Forward: Context-Specific Solutions
Besides the aforementioned factors, gender and demographic considerations are crucial in designing inclusive and effective return and reintegration programmes. Tailoring these programmes to the specific needs of women, men and children ensures they are responsive to the realities of displaced communities and address the diverse challenges faced upon return. Gender-sensitive approaches must account for differences in legal, economic and social reintegration needs, as well as distinct vulnerabilities that may arise during the return process.
Finally, it is essential for return and reintegration strategies to be context specific. For example, voluntary return programmes for Ukrainians after the end of Russia’s invasion will require approaches that are vastly different from those for Syrians due to their distinct demographic, cultural and socio-political contexts. A one-size-fits-all approach cannot adequately address the complexities of displacement.
Dr Meltem Ineli Ciger is an Associate Professor at Suleyman Demirel University and an Associate of the Migration Policy Centre, EUI
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