Blog post by Manoug Antaby, a Research Assistant at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies
After the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011, Lebanon, Türkiye, and Jordan became key destinations for Syrians fleeing the violence in their country. Over 13 years later, millions of Syrians are still scattered across the globe. Prior to the 2024 Israeli war, the Lebanese government indicated that there are more than 2 million Syrian refugees in the country, making Lebanon the country with the highest number of refugees per capita and per square kilometer in the world.
The recent Israeli war on Lebanon has directly impacted Syrian refugees, influencing their decisions to move to safer areas within Lebanon or even back to Syria. This leads us to question whether the movement of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, either internally or externally, is voluntary or a form of forced displacement. Additionally, it prompts us to consider the effectiveness of fundamental laws for protecting refugees and the role of humanitarian actors in such complex crises. The legal, political, and humanitarian complexities shaping the internal and external movement of Syrian refugees in light of the Israeli war on Lebanon highlight the need for more adaptive refugee protection laws and humanitarian strategies that prioritize affected populations over legal status and labels.
The Plight of Syrian Refugees Before and during the Israeli War
For many Syrians, Lebanon was initially seen as a safe haven from the armed conflict in Syria, while others considered it as a temporary stop before seeking refuge in more developed countries. Before the Israeli war, only 779,645 Syrian refugees were registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). After 13 years from the conflict in Syria, the number of Syrian refugees has been increasing rather than decreasing. By December 2023, the Lebanese government was estimating that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in the country, but after five months, it turned out to be over two million Syrians in the country, revealing a 25% increase in the number of Syrians in Lebanon. Voluntary returns amongst Syrian refugees have been minimal. As per the UNHCR reports, 10,130 Syrian refugees voluntarily left Lebanon to return to Syria in 2023, compared to the 9,814 refugees who went back to their home country in 2022. In Lebanon, UNHCR leads and coordinates humanitarian activities with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and non-state actors to provide essential services and aid to Syrian refugees, such as food, education, shelter, and healthcare.
The Israeli war on Lebanon, which escalated sharply in mid-September 2024, has had devastating impacts on Syrian refugees. The Israeli attacks on Lebanon took various forms, including pagers attacks, airstrikes, and assaults through advanced missiles, causing widespread destruction across various regions in the country and resulting in civilian casualties. Syrian refugees were directly affected by these attacks. For example, in a fierce Israeli airstrike on the ancient city of Baalbek in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley, a building hosting Syrian refugee workers was destroyed, killing 19 Syrian refugee workers. Additionally, other Israeli attacks on areas with heavy concentrations of Syrian refugees resulted in the death of 126 Syrians, leaving 29 wounded and 4 missing. Yet, these numbers may be underreported due to the lack of comprehensive data about this issue.
The war, coupled with Lebanon’s already dire socio-economic conditions, has put the lives of Syrian refugees at great risk, triggering an internal and external mass movement among Syrians. According to Bassam Mawlawi, the Lebanese Minister of Interior and Municipalities, 311,000 Syrian refugees returned to their home country, Syria, within just two weeks of the conflict. While 67% of Syrian refugees took legal routes to return to Syria, 37% of them crossed back illegally, risking their lives in search of safety. The number of UNHCR-registered refugees dropped to 768,353 as of 30 September 2024, suggesting that over 20,000 registered Syrian refugees had returned to Syria. Additionally, 1,545 cases of internally displacement in Lebanon were recorded among Syrian refugees, including 379 children and 215 women.
Despite the efforts of key humanitarian actors to assist displaced populations and those affected by the attacks, the provided aid remains insufficient to meet the needs of over one million people in Lebanon. Malawi openly stated that the shelter centers would be allocated and used exclusively for Lebanese citizens. This reveals the humanitarian tragedy faced by Syrian refugees within Lebanon, as the Lebanese authorities publicly signal that the lives and safety of these refugees are not a priority.
Key Frameworks of “Refugee-ness”
The mechanisms designed to protect refugees and promote their welfare are rooted in longstanding systems, norms, and treaties. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” Given that the 1951 Refugee Convention is a status-based protection instrument, refugees must fall into the criteria set by the convention and be granted official refugee status to ensure their safety and security.
One of the most essential principles highlighted in the 1951 Refugee Convention, also adopted in international refugee law, is the principle of non-refoulement. This principle prevents refugee-hosting states from expelling refugees back to their country of origin when the potential for irreparable harm exists. As the emphasis of this principle is placed on refugee-hosting states’ actions, it overlooks other factors that may push refugees to return to unsafe conditions in their home country, thus putting their lives at high risk. This gap creates disparity in the legal framework, thus impeding humanitarian efforts and responses to crises involving forced returns and underlining the limitations of the international refugee protection regime.
Internally displaced people (IDPs), as defined by UNHCR, are individuals who “have been forced to flee their homes by conflict, violence, persecution or disasters; however, unlike refugees, they remain within their own country.” The second part of this definition indicates that IDPs are only those who are displaced within their countries, thus neglecting situations where foreign nationals or refugees are displaced within a host country. This shows the paralysis of the system, exposing its inadequacies in responding to complicated and unusual cases of internal displacement crises.
The Current Syrian Mass Movement: Between Internal Displacement and Return to Syria?
Despite the cruciality of laws and concepts designed to protect refugees and mitigate humanitarian crises, the fragility of the international refugee system has been exposed, particularly in the case of Syrian refugees following the Israeli war on Lebanon. This is evident in the lack of frameworks capable of effectively tackling the sub-displacement crisis faced by Syrians, both internally and externally, triggered by the war. It is important to note that Lebanon has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention that imposes the principle of non-refoulment on party states, thus only being bound by the customary international law principle of non-refoulement. Thus, for years, the Lebanese government has been attempting to address the issue of Syrian refugees who entered Lebanon illegally by forcibly sending them back to Syria, a strategy that started in 2023. However, the current mass movement of Syrian refugees is not solely driven by the Lebanese authority’s decision.
Given the problematic definition of IDP, there is a need to reassess the status of Syrian refugees displaced within Lebanon. Since they are not in their home country, can they be considered IDPs? The main challenge is that the majority of Syrian refugees are not registered at UNHCR, meaning they do not have official refugee status. In light of the recent Israeli war, displaced Syrian refugees in Lebanon are in legal limbo. They either have the refugee status or fall under a composite status of “Syrian refugees internally displaced in Lebanon.” This composite status implies that they are neither fully recognized refugees nor in a position to ask for protection and basic rights. This can be explained by referring to two key factors. First, the international community and international humanitarian regime lack the instruments to know the “how” and “what” of the management of such cases. This can be illustrated by referring to the inadequate strategies and the ineffectual utilization of available ones by the international players in addressing such cases. Second, the Lebanese government’s inhumane and harsh stance towards unregistered Syrian refugees and even the UNHCR itself further complicated the refugee crisis in Lebanon. Even those registered with the UNHCR and displaced internally are left vulnerable due to the absence of effective and adaptive frameworks that can respond to this complex crisis, making Syrians among the most affected populations.
When analyzing the issue of Syrian refugees’ return to Syria, it is essential to critically investigate the nature of these returns. While no state actor, like the Lebanese government, is explicitly forcing Syrian refugees to return to their country, it is baseless and misleading to assume that all returns are truly voluntary. There are substantial contradictions between the principle of non-refoulment, mainly addressing the forced repatriation of refugees and the realities shaping Syrian refugees’ return to their home country. Syrian refugees in Lebanon are under severe threat of irreversible harm, serving as the main reason behind their return to Syria and other safer areas.
For some Syrian refugees, the threats posed by staying in Lebanon—such as the ongoing Israeli attacks on civilians and systematic violence—outweigh the risks associated with returning to Syria, despite the continued insecurity and safety concerns, poverty, unemployment, and several other issues there. This is illustrated by the return of 311,000 Syrian refugees to Syria, a figure expected to rise with the continuation of the war in Lebanon. In this context, the return of Syrian refugees could be described as ‘voluntary forced return,’ where refugees have the choice to stay in Lebanon but are faced by indirect coercion—due to the Israeli large-scale attacks on Lebanon—and have no real choice other than leaving the country. Therefore, the voluntary part of this return is that no state actors compelled these refugees to go back to their country, while the forced nature of this return is related to the external conditions such as the Israeli war, pushing them to choose between dangerous alternatives. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether these refugees are returnees or double-displaced refugees, especially since the reasons driving their return still fall under the same category of factors that initially made them refugees.
Beyond Legal Status and Towards the Essence of Humanitarian Action
The internal displacement of Syrians in Lebanon and the return of hundreds of thousands of them to Syria increase the need for more effective and timely responses to the needs of people. Analyzing the status and “refugee-ness” of Syrians in relation to fundamental concepts, law, and criteria pertaining to refugees reveals that they face both internal displacement and “voluntary forced return” following the Israeli war on Lebanon.
Given the current political, security, social, and economic situation in Syria, the country is ill-prepared to receive such a large number of returnees. However, considering the dire situation of Syrians who escaped the escalating violence and returned to their home country, their safety and security are the top priorities. This means that meeting returnees’ basic needs for survival, protecting them from any political persecution and other human rights violations, and promoting their safety and security are and must be at the forefront of domestic, international, state, and non-state actors’ agendas. The lives of Syrian refugee IDPs in Lebanon are not any less important. Addressing this complex and multifaceted internal displacement crisis requires multi-level interventions aimed at saving lives of affected populations and reducing potential harms.
This demands high levels of political willingness and cooperation among humanitarian actors and the international community, which are fundamental for protecting displaced Syrians living in precarious conditions and with different legal statuses. Hence, instead of the status of people, the needs they have and the humanitarian principles should guide the responses to these complex crises.
The role of Lebanese government is critical. It should adopt a more humanitarian approach, demonstrating its intention and aim to protect internally displaced Syrians, even while prioritizing local citizens. The Lebanese government has been sending back Syrian refugees to Syria. Thus, it is of the Lebanese authorities’ interest to collaborate on this issue, especially in safeguarding a secure route for Syrian refugees to arrive safely to their country. The Syrian authorities, on the other hand, must facilitate the entry of Syrian refugees to their home country by exempting entry fees from them and protecting their basic rights.
Despite the decreased credibility of the humanitarian system and the international community, particularly after the ineffective response in crises such as Gaza, their role remains paramount in addressing the Syrian mass displacement crisis in Lebanon. The international community’s role is not restricted to monitoring the numbers and needs of Syrians being displaced in Lebanon or returning to Syria. It possesses the diplomatic leverage necessary to pressure the Israeli regime into excluding non-combatant civilians (including Syrians) from military targets. This would help safeguard civilians and ensure their security. Additionally, the international community can provide financial and technical support to humanitarian actors responsible for the facilitation of Syrian refugees’ return to Syria. Moreover, putting Syrian refugees—rather than their status—at the heart of this issue, the international community must embrace diplomacy through negotiations with the Syrian authorities and other forms of persuasive methods with a goal of ensuring a dignified and secure future for these refugees.
Sustainable solutions for this multifaceted crisis must focus on fostering a conducive environment for positive and lasting change in the lives of Syrian refugees, both in Lebanon and Syria. However, immediate crisis management is also essential and mainly falls under the responsibility of humanitarian actors on the ground. Their primary role in such situations is usually seen as delivering basic assistance—food, shelter, clean water, healthcare, and protection—to affected populations. Yet, with humanitarian actors and peacekeeping missions becoming direct targets of Israeli attacks, these efforts are increasingly obstructed, worsening the already dire situation for Syrians. These factors urge us to demand macro-level efforts, striving towards protecting the lives of people, especially those displaced multiple times such as Syrians in Lebanon, through no fault of their own.
Author:
Manoug Antaby is a Research Assistant at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, holding a Master’s degree in Public Health (Health Management and Policy) and currently pursuing a second Master’s degree in Conflict Management and Humanitarian Action.
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