Blog post by Megan Powell, Independent Researcher. *
Introduction
The European Union (EU) faces a critical dilemma in its approach to immigration: its increasingly securitised policies are undermining long-term European security. In recent decades, the movement of people from Africa and the Middle East to Europe has shifted from a peripheral political issue to a central focus of European security discussions. This shift has been fuelled by rising migration numbers, driven by conflicts, poverty, and environmental changes, which has, in turn, intensified disinformation, xenophobia, and the rise of right-wing parties across Europe. As a result, the EU has adopted stringent policies, including “border externalisation”, which involves outsourcing border control to non-EU countries in order to reduce the number of migrants reaching the Schengen borders.
Central to this strategy are agreements with key border states in North Africa, such as Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco, due to their geographical proximity to Europe and their pivotal role in migration routes. The region not only serves as a point of origin but also as a major transit point for migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean. The border externalisation agreements involve a range of measures aimed at preventing migrants from reaching Europe, including EU funding for weapons and militarised borders across North Africa, cooperation with non-state actors, and the establishment of migration processing centres outside the EU. In return for their cooperation, the EU provides these countries with financial incentives and political support. These agreements effectively turn these countries into de facto gatekeepers of Europe’s external borders, enhancing their capacity to control borders and intercept migrants before they reach Europe.
This article explores the central issue of European security. While the EU’s migration policies of border externalisation have been implemented to increase EU security, a closer examination finds that they compromise it in several critical ways. Specifically, these strategies undermine EU unity, impede the pursuit of strategic interests, destabilise neighbouring regions, erode Europe’s soft power, and promote selective adherence to international law. Ultimately, these policies contradict the EU’s own security strategy as outlined in its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which advocates for a comprehensive approach incorporating diplomacy, humanitarian efforts, development, and cooperation. This piece will describe how in doing so, the EU and its member states sacrifice long-term European security for short-term fixes that respond to the increasingly securitised nature of migration.
Humanitarian Condemnation vs. Realpolitik: The Limits of Liberal Critiques
The EU´s border externalisation policies have sparked significant debate about their ethical implications. Humanitarian organisations and liberal critics have repeatedly condemned the EU’s approach, arguing that it violates international law and undermines the individual security and human rights of migrants. Scholars have further underscored the moral implications, demonstrating how these policies reduce legal migration pathways, thereby forcing migrants into the hands of smugglers and onto more perilous routes to Europe. However, these discussions often fall short in addressing the broader strategic dimensions of these policies for the EU, and thus despite this widespread condemnation, efforts to reform EU border externalisation policies have had limited success.
Understanding and highlighting not only the moral consequences, but also the security implications of these measures and their negative impact on long-term European stability, is essential to implement real policy change. The persistence of the policies is driven by a resurgence of realist perspectives, in which border externalisation is regarded as a necessary safeguard against the perceived threat of uncontrolled migration. This shift from liberal, cooperative principles towards state-focused security aligns with a broader trend in international relations, where national interests increasingly overshadow the protection of individual human rights. The EU’s unwavering commitment to these policies, despite ethical objections, underscores this global realignment.
To address this, global discussions on migration must be reframed to accommodate contemporary state-centric dynamics. By emphasising the strategic shortcomings and long-term European security risks posed by unethical border externalisation practices, we can bridge the gap between humanitarian concerns and security needs, advocating for a rights-based approach that serves both. Realigning EU actions with its human rights commitments enshrined in the EU’s CSDP is not only ethically necessary but also strategically crucial for European security. Failure to do so risks undermining the EU’s ability to ensure long-term stability, both within its borders and globally.
How Border Externalisation in North Africa Reduces European Security
The EU’s border externalisation policies diminish European security in five critical ways: they fragment cohesion among EU member states; leave the EU vulnerable to coercive diplomacy which hinders the achievement of EU strategic goals; contribute to instability in neighbouring regions; weaken the EU’s soft power; and undermine international respect for the rule of law.
1. Fragmentation of EU Cohesion
One of the most significant ways in which border externalisation undermines European security is by reducing unity among EU member states. The EU’s approach to migration has always been a contentious issue, with different countries adopting varying policies and attitudes towards migrants. The Dublin Regulation, which assigns asylum responsibility to the country of first entry, exacerbates these differences, as frontline states bear the brunt of migration pressures. This lack of cohesion, intensified by the securitisation of migration, has fragmented the EU’s response and increased tensions between members, with individual states prioritising their own interests over collective action.
This disunity is particularly evident in the “waterbed effect”, where stricter border controls in one country lead to an increase in migration flows through another, as migrants shift to alternative routes. In 2011, Libya was the primary departure point for migrants crossing the Mediterranean to Italy. Although it initially appeared that agreements between Libya and the EU – as well as Libya and Italy – had reduced arrivals by nearly 100,000, migration numbers gradually rose again as migration routes shifted to neighbouring countries. By 2023, Tunisia had become the top departure country, however, following the 2023 EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding, migration routes shifted back to Libya, once again making it the primary departure point for migrants bound for Italy.
This ripple effect significantly reduces the overall effectiveness of EU migration policy and weakens the EU’s ability to manage migration effectively. It also affects the effectiveness of EU cooperation in global initiatives, demonstrated by 11 member states´ refusal to endorse the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, despite its non-binding status. When member states fail to cooperate on critical issues like migration, it sends a signal to the rest of the world that the EU is divided, and thus unable to present a united front to implement efficient policies. This perception of disunity can embolden external actors to exploit these divisions, further compromising European security.
2. Vulnerability to Coercive Diplomacy
Another major consequence of border externalisation is that it makes the EU vulnerable to coercive diplomacy. By outsourcing border control to third countries, the EU has created a situation where these countries can use their strategic position on key migration routes to extract concessions from Europe.
For instance, North African countries such as Libya and Tunisia have leveraged their role as gatekeepers of Europe’s borders to secure increasing amounts of financial aid. Former Libyan dictator Gaddafi insisted on the relaxation of European economic sanctions, and in 2010 demanded €5 billion annually from the EU in exchange for cooperating to prevent migration to Europe. Similarly, Tunisian leader Saied rejected a EU offer of €67 million to enhance Mediterranean patrols following the EU-Tunisian Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), confident that the EU would eventually raise its offer. As seen by the EU´s subsequent higher offer, this power shift weakens the EU’s leverage in negotiations and forces it into a reactive position, where increasingly higher concessions are needed to prevent migrants from reaching Europe.
This vulnerability is further exacerbated by the ability of these countries to influence EU policy in ways that may not align with Europe’s broader strategic interests. A prominent example is Morocco´s orchestration of irregular migration into Ceuta in 2021, which likely influenced Spain’s decision to support Morocco on the Western Sahara issue. This had a knock on effect on EU policy as it led to strained relations with Algeria, a key EU gas supplier, entangling the EU in regional power struggles that complicate its long-term geopolitical interests.
By relying on third countries to control migration, the EU leaves itself increasingly dependent on external actors. This growing reliance compromises its capacity to pursue its own strategic interests and exposes it to manipulation by external partners. In the long term, it undermines the EU’s ability to act as an independent and cohesive actor in international affairs, diminishing its influence and credibility on the global stage.
3. Destabilisation of Neighbouring Regions
The externalisation of border control has also contributed to the destabilisation of neighbouring regions. By strengthening both state and non-state military actors in North Africa, the EU has inadvertently fuelled conflicts on its doorstep.
In its attempt to curb migration, the EU granted €122 billion in arms export licences to African nations between 2007 and 2016, including €137 million to Libya, despite the country being subject to EU and UN arms embargoes. The militarisation of border controls has led to increased violence and severe human rights abuses, exacerbating tensions in the region. Reports of violence and mistreatment of migrants by EU funded security forces in Libya and Tunisia have fuelled instability and anti-European sentiment. This not only undermines the EU’s efforts to promote stability in its neighbourhood but also increases the risk of radicalisation and terrorist activity, which directly threatens European security given its geographic proximity.
The EU’s support for non-state actors through agreements such as the Minniti agreement between Italy and Libya, has also legitimised shadow states operating outside the control of the central government. By intentionally incorporating militias, foreign armed groups, and smuggling networks – some of whom have faced UN sanctions for trafficking – into the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) and other official security systems to oversee border controls, the EU has inadvertently empowered these actors. This has led to the misuse of military equipment and the creation of a “migration industry”, exacerbating ongoing conflict and instability in the region. This destabilisation poses a direct threat to European security, as it creates conditions where terrorism and organised crime can flourish.
4. Erosion of Europe’s Soft Power
One of the most significant long-term consequences of border externalisation is the erosion of Europe’s soft power – its ability to influence others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion. For decades, Europe has prided itself on being a global advocate for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, the EU’s border externalisation policies are severely undermining this image and create a troubling gap between the EU’s condemnation of global human rights abuses, and its own security policies.
Firstly, by cooperating with authoritarian regimes to manage migration, the EU compromises the democratic and human rights principles enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Of the 35 African countries involved in EU migration agreements, 12 present “extreme” human rights risks, while the remaining 23 are classified as posing “high risks”. In this support for repressive leaders, the EU diminishes its moral authority and soft power on the global stage.
Moreover, the EU’s own border policies have directly harmed human security and violated human rights in North Africa. As migrants are increasingly forced into more perilous routes, the Mediterranean has seen a surge in fatalities, with deaths in the first half of 2023 surpassing the total from 2018 to 2022. Since 2014, approximately 30,000 migrants have died attempting to cross, a tragedy exacerbated by the EU´s criminalisation of NGO search and rescue operations. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has condemned the EU’s role in these deaths as well as the human rights abuses in Libya, labelling the violence against migrants since 2016 in EU run detention centres as “crimes against humanity”.
The African Union (AU) has refused to enter into EU border externalisation agreements, leading the EU to cherry pick African leaders willing to turn a blind eye to these violations in exchange for financial gains. This stance further highlights the existing conditional “donor-recipient relationship” between Africa and the EU that perpetuates colonial power dynamics. However, these human rights violations have tarnished the EU’s reputation in Africa, and are contributing to a growing anti-Western sentiment. As a result, many African states are turning to new alliances that promise a more cooperative and non-interventionist approach.
China is one such state and has pursued a different strategy in Africa; one that prioritises development and economic cooperation while adhering to a policy of non-interference in internal affairs. This approach has made it a more attractive partner for many African countries, including Morocco, which plays a key role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Between 2011 and 2015, Chinese investment in Morocco surged by 195%, positioning the country as a regional trade hub. The consequences of these differing approaches were reflected in a 2020 study, which highlighted that Southern Mediterranean countries see the EU as more than twice as likely to destabilise the region compared to China, reflecting how European actions are increasingly seen as harmful.
While liberal critiques of the EU’s human rights violations often focus on moral grounds, weakening the EU’s position as a champion of human rights can also have detrimental long-term security consequences. As Europe becomes increasingly associated with policies that violate human rights and offer unilateral benefits, it loses legitimacy on the world stage, making it more difficult to form alliances, exert influence, wield soft power, promote its values, and shape global norms.
5. Undermining International Law
Finally, the EU’s border externalisation policies undermine the international legal frameworks established to protect human rights and promote global security, leaving not only Europe, but the entire international community relatively less secure.
The principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning individuals to countries where they may face persecution, is a cornerstone of international refugee law, and is also enshrined in other international and regional legal human rights documents. However, despite UNHCR´s declaration that Libya does not qualify as a “safe country,” more than 23,000 migrants were intercepted by the EU-funded Libyan coastguard in 2021 alone and forced back to Libya where they were subjected to kidnapping, trafficking, sexual abuse, and torture. By outsourcing border control to countries with poor human rights records, the EU is effectively bypassing this principle of non-refoulement, not only jeopardising the safety of migrants but also undermining the very international legal frameworks it claims to uphold.
Further violations of international law are evident in Italy´s criminalisation of search and rescue operations, as well as the intentional neglect of individuals in distress within territorial waters and on the high seas – both actions that contravene the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Additionally, the EU´s use of detention centres for migrants returned to Libya violates the non-criminalisation of irregular entry or stay enshrined in the 1951 Convention of Refugees, as well as the principle that detention should only be used as a last resort, found in the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the Global Compact on Refugees.
This selective adherence to international law weakens global respect for these norms and sets a dangerous precedent. As international law becomes optional, it loses its significance and leads to a bureaucratic security dilemma in which states undermine international law to gain an advantage, prompting others to do the same. This has been evident in the increasing disregard for international law seen by the actions of states such as China in the South China Sea, Israel’s disregard for ICJ rulings, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
If Europe, a region that has historically championed human rights and the rule of law, is willing to violate these principles for the sake of short-term gains, it sends a signal to other countries that they can, and should, do the same. This will inevitably lead to a broader erosion of respect for international law, increase global instability and undermine the very foundations of the international system that Europe relies on for its security.
Conclusion: Rethinking European Security
The EU’s border externalisation policies in North Africa are not just moral issues; they are strategic missteps that ultimately reduce European security. These policies have fragmented EU cohesion, made Europe vulnerable to coercive diplomacy, destabilised neighbouring regions, eroded Europe’s soft power, and weakened global respect for international law. By responding to the securitisation of migration with short-term fixes that prioritise state and regional security over human security, the EU is undermining its own security objectives and sacrificing long-term security and global stability.
In advocating for policy change, human rights advocates and humanitarian organisations should consider the increasingly state-centred dynamics in international relations, and adapt their strategies to emphasise these security concerns alongside moral imperatives. By framing border externalisation policies in terms of both ethical obligations and long-term strategic stability, they can better engage with policymakers who hold the power to influence change. This approach will ensure that humanitarian concerns are not sidelined in favour of short-term responses to securitised issues such as migration, but rather integrated into a more comprehensive, rights-based approach that aligns with both human rights and broader security objectives.
European policymakers must rethink their approach to migration and security. In today’s globalised society, true security cannot be achieved by building walls and outsourcing responsibility; it requires a commitment to the values and principles that have long defined Europe. Rather than doubling down on policies that hinder Europe´s ability to uphold these values and isolate it from the global community, the EU should seek to realign its actions with its own long-term security objectives. This means upholding human rights, promoting both regional and international, mutually beneficial cooperation, and working towards a more inclusive and stable global order by upholding respect for international law.
Additional references
Collins, A. (Ed.). (2022). Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford University Press.
Opi, B. (2021). Borders recolonised – The impacts of the EU externalisation policy in Africa. Journal of Decolonising Disciplines, 3(1&2). 0.35293/jddv3i1.3718
Walia, H. (2021). Border & Rule: Global Migration, Capitalism, and the Rise of Racist Nationalism. Haymarket Books.
* This work is based on research conducted for an undergraduate thesis in International Relations at Universidad Europea de Valencia. Contact: meganchristinapowell@gmail.com
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